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A UNIVERSALIST HISTORY OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION (II)1
Diane A. Desierto
"To be non-Orientalist means to accept the continuing tension between the need to
universalize our perceptions, analyses, and statements of values and the need to defend
their particularist roots against the incursion of the particularist perceptions, analyses, and
statements of values coming from others who claim they are putting forward universals.
We are required to universalize our particulars and particularize our universals
simultaneously and in a kind of constant dialectical exchange, which allows us to find new
syntheses that are then of course instantly called into question. It is not an easy game."
- Immanuel Wallerstein in EUROPEAN UNIVERSALISM: The Rhetoric of Power
"Sec.2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all
nations.
Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights."
- art. II, secs. 2 and 11, 1987 Philippine Constitution3
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Abstract: This paper traces universalism --- the vision of international public order
built upon rights and values shared by all individuals and peoples --- as a
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purposely-embedded ideology in the history and evolution of the Philippine
Constitution. As the postcolonial and post-dictatorship founding document of the
post-modern Philippine polity, the paper contends that 1987 Philippine Constitution
enshrines nearly a century of constitutional text and practice which has led towards
the present institutionalization of universalist rights-democratic theory in the
Philippines' constitutional interpretive canon.
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I. UNIVERSALISM 'CONSTITUTIONALIZED': DESIGN, ORIENTATION,
PHILOSOPHY, AND MODES OF ENTRY
1.1. The Universalist Design, Orientation, and Philosophy of the 1987
Philippine Constitution
Against the previous discussion in Part I of this Article in Volume 10 of the
Historia Constitucional of ideological currents in the history of Philippine
constitutionalism, I now approach the universalist characterization of the 1987
Philippine Constitution from three areas. First, from aspects of its constitutional
design, I submit that the plethora of institutional checks against the arbitrariness
and abusive potential of executive power (e.g. expanded judicial review and rule-
making powers of the Supreme Court; impeachment mechanisms and the
establishment of special constitutional offices such as the Office of the
Ombudsman and the Commission on Human Rights; provision for direct
amendment of the Constitution by the people; partylist representation, multiparty
system and the prohibition against political dynasties; among others) comprises a
set of more direct avenues that empowers Filipino individuals to make and
legitimate their political judgments in Philippine public order. These institutional
checks were purposely devised by the Constitutional Commissioners with the end
in view of restoring the constitutional primacy of the Filipino individual through his
participation in popular sovereignty.
Second, the orientation of the 1987 Constitution shows a strong
entrenchment of a rights-culture that appears more universalist in character than in
previous constitutional epochs. At the time of drafting of the 1987 Constitution,
active Philippine participation in the international legal order ---- as one of the
original signatories of the United Nations Charter, and for having ratified all the
major human rights treaties and signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
--had already informed our conceptions of human rights. As seen from Philippine
legal history, the concept of rights inherent to the individual by virtue of his/her
basic humanity was a staple in our constitutional rights discourse. Given the
atrocities of strongman rule in the Marcos dictatorship, the Constitutional
Commissioners were assiduous in ensuring the textualization of ever more
numerous individual rights. More importantly, however, the Constitutional
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Commissioners had the foresight to recognize that international legal principles on
individual human rights were not static normative conceptions. Maintaining the
avenue of incorporation, (alongside a pacific internationalist foreign policy on use
of force) would not only ensure that the full corpus of the Filipino individual's
human rights would be accorded constitutional protection, but that the Philippine
government would dynamically recognize its evolving responsibilities as a
sovereign independent state in the international legal order.
Finally, the philosophy of the 1987 Constitution is quaintly described by the
Constitutional Commissioners themselves as "pro-life, pro-people, pro-poor, pro-
Filipino, and anti-dictatorship". These are aspirations towards realizing
(universalist) fundamental human dignity values --- first articulated by the 1899
Malolos Congress, but never motivating constitutional philosophy as strongly until
the present 1987 Constitution.
There are many critics of the 1987 Constitution whose arguments swing from
a pendulum.4  On one end (which I prefer to call the 'weak state' objection),
critique veers to the perceived excesses of diluting executive power, and the
political instability caused or fomented by this constitutional policy. And on the
other (the 'mob rule' objection), critique is leveled at 'entrusting' Filipino individual
rationality with 'too much democracy' or 'too many rights' that result in exercises
detrimental to 'responsible citizenship'. Each critique has its own claims to validity,
the evaluation of which would be beyond the scope of this work. Nonetheless,
while the universalist response to these critiques could be the subject of separate
research altogether, my universalist analysis of various executive particularist acts
elsewhere5 will contribute to a broader understanding of the actual persuasive
value of normative assumptions in both objections on the supposed 'weak state'
and 'mob rule' tendencies created by the 1987 Constitution.
But we must begin the evaluation of those critiques somewhere. I submit
that a keener understanding of our constitutional orientation, design, and
philosophy is a useful beginning for appreciating (and responding) to the 'weak
state' and 'mob rule' critiques. Thus, the important descriptive result for now is the
apparent constitutionalization of the universalist vision of a public law conception
that has moved towards cosmopolitan democratic public order --- and ultimately, to
4 See Kasuya, Yuko, "Weak Institutions and Strong Movements: The Case of President
Estrada's Impeachment and Removal in the Philippines", in JODY C. BAUMGARTNER (ed.),
CHECKING EXECUTIVE POWER: Presidential Impeachment in Comparative Perspective, (2003
ed., Praeger); "Lee Sr. says Arroyo's takeover no boost for democracy", Associated Press, January
23, 2001.
5 See Diane A. Desierto, "Universalist Constitutionalism in the Philippines: Restricting Executive
Particularism in the Form of Executive Privilege", Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee/Journal of Law
and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America, vol. 1, 2009, at pp. 80-105.
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one that is governed by the rationality of fundamental human dignity values. It is a
more complete approximation of universalism than previous constitutional epochs.6
1.2. Universalist Constitutional Design
The 1987 Constitution introduced various institutional and popular
sovereignty mechanisms which Filipino individuals could harness to check the
excesses of executive power. As shown in the records of the Constitutional
Commission and affirmed by subsequent jurisprudential practice, these
mechanisms were purposely detailed in the 1987 Constitution as forms of
executive restraint:
1.2.1. Expanded power of judicial review
Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution is a broader formulation of the
power of judicial review than in previous Philippine Constitutions:
"Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Unlike the United States Constitution which does not expressly textualize
judicial review (first explained in the leading case of Marbury v. Madison which
elicited the principle of judicial review from "particular phraseology" of the US
Constitution that was "supposed to be essential to all written constitutions"), Article
Vill, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution expressly establishes judicial review in the
Philippine constitutional system. The Philippine Supreme Court dates the initial
exercise of judicial review (through invalidation of constitutionally infirm legislative
acts) way back to 1902, stating that the executive and legislative branches
effectively acknowledged the power of judicial review in provisions of the Civil
Code that mandated consistency of legislative, administrative, and executive acts
with the Constitution as a requirement for legality.7 This provision of the 1987
6 As will be seen in the second half of this Article, the constitutional avenues to universalism
(e.g. the Incorporation Clause and sources of international law) remain grossly underutilized, if not
undertheorized, in our public law discourse.
7 Ernesto B. Francisco Jr. et al. v. House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, 160310, 160318, 160342, 160343, 160360, 160365, 160370,
160376, 160392, 160397, 160403, and 160405, November 10, 2003 (en banc), citing Supreme
Court Justice VICENTE V. MENDOZA (Ret.), SHARING THE PASSION AND ACTION OF OUR
TIME 62-53 (2003); Article 7, Civil Code of the Philippines:
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Constitution expanded the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to include
cases of "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." As noted by the
Court, the rationale for this expansion is attributable to the experience of martial
law under the Marcos dictatorship. Former Chief Justice and 1986 Constitutional
Commissioner Roberto Concepcion proposed the expansion to avoid repetition of
the Court's experience in failing to resolve crucial human rights cases due to the
obstacle of the political question doctrine:
"Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of
our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the
deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in
a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal
defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political
questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles
concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority
of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters
related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the
government set up the defense of political question. And the
Supreme Court said: 'Well, since it is political, we have no authority
to pass upon it'. The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was
not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely
request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in
effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law
regime...
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of
the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which
means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle
"Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance
shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void
and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders, and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution."
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matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a
political question."8
Dean Pacifico Agabin notes the counter-majoritarian objection against such
an expansion of judicial review in light of the demonstrated history and ideological
conservativism of the judiciary in the Philippines, stating that the "pendulum of
judicial power [has swung] to the other extreme where the Supreme Court can now
sit as 'superlegislature' and 'superpresident'..If there is such a thing as judicial
supremacy, this is it."9 Article VIII, Section 1 is a constitutional policy to give a
'heavier weighting of the judicial role in government', according to former Supreme
Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, as a reflection of the "strong expectations in
[Philippine] society concerning the ability and willingness of our Court to function
as part of the internal balance of power arrangements, and somehow to identify
and check or contain the excesses of the political departments."10  Former
Supreme Court Justice Santiago Kapunan cautioned, however, against the
'inherently antidemocratic' nature of the expanded judicial review power:
"This brings me to one more important point: The idea that a
norm of constitutional adjudication could be lightly brushed aside on
the mere supposition that an issue before the Court is of paramount
public concern does great harm to a democratic system which
espouses a delicate balance between three separate but coequal
branches of government. It is equally of paramount public concern,
certainly paramount to the survival of our democracy, that acts of the
other branches of government are accorded due respect by this
Court. Such acts, done within their sphere of competence, have
been --- and should always be --- accorded with a presumption of
regularity. When such acts are assailed as illegal or unconstitutional,
the burden falls upon those who assail these acts to prove that they
satisfy the essential norms of constitutional adjudication, because
when we finally proceed to declare an act of the executive or
legislative branch of our government unconstitutional or illegal, what
we actually accomplish is the thwarting of the will of the elected
representatives of the people in the executive or legislative branches
of government. Notwithstanding Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution, since the exercise of the power of judicial review by this
Court is inherently antidemocratic, this Court should exercise a
8 Id., citing I Record of the Constitutional Commission 434-436 (1986).
9 Agabin, Pacifico A., "The Politics of Judicial Review over Executive Action: The Supreme
Court and Social Change", pp. 167-198 in PACIFICO A. AGABIN, UNCONSTITUTIONAL ESSAYS,
(1996 ed., University of the Philippines Press).
10 Feliciano, Florentino P., "The Application of Law: Some Recurring Aspects of the Process
of Judicial Review and Decision Making", 37 Am. J. Juris. 17, (1992), at 29.
SSee Kilosbayan Inc. et al. v. Teofisto Guingona Jr. et al., G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994,
(Kapunan, J., dissenting). Emphasis supplied.
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becoming modesty in acting as a revisor of an act of the executive or
legislative branch. The tendency of a frequent and easy resort to the
function of judicial review, particularly in areas of economic policy has
become lamentably too common as to dwarf the political capacity of
the people expressed through their representatives in the policy
making branches of the government and to deaden their sense of
moral responsibility."
Clearly, the expansion of judicial review is a constitutional policy that does
not immunize our courts from politics. Justice Feliciano affirms that a court fulfills
dual functions ('deciding' as opposed to 'law-making') in the three-pronged process
of applying legal norms to any given controversy before it: 1) determination of the
operative facts; 2) determination of the applicable legal or normative prescriptions;
and 3) relating the applicable prescriptions to the operative facts. 12 Inevitably, the
elasticity of the Court's use of its power of judicial review under the 'grave abuse of
discretion' standard in Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution would depend
to a significant extent on the rationality, Predispositions, and value judgments of
the majority of the members of the Court.'
Since the promulgation of the 1987 Constitution, Filipino individuals and
citizens' groups have sought recourse to the expanded judicial review power of the
Supreme Court to directly file petitions for writs to annul, enjoin, or prohibit
governmental acts that violate fundamental human rights and civil liberties, and/or
to compel governmental conduct towards observance of such rights and liberties.
In the words of the Court, this expansion of judicial power "is an antidote to and a
safety net against whimsical, despotic, and oppressive exercise of governmental
power."14  As such, the expansion of the Court's power of judicial review
contemplates any governmental deprivation of rights within the penumbra of the
individual's constitutionally-guaranteed rights to life, liberty, and due process.15
Over the last two decades since the promulgation the 1987 Constitution, the
Court has issued writs and/or resolved cases on fundamental civil liberties and
basic constitutional rights guarantees using its expanded judicial review power,
including, among others: 1) nullifying administrative rules and regulations issued
by the executive department that contravened the constitutionally-mandated
12 Id., at 34-36.
13 The Supreme Court admitted the elasticity of the 'grave abuse of discretion' standard, citing
Justice Isagani A. Cruz, in the landmark anti-logging case of Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083,
July 30, 1993, which involved a Petition hinged on the alleged existence of an 'intergenerational'
right to a healthful and balanced ecology, which right the Court held was sufficient to vest standing
on petitioners on behalf of minors and generations yet unborn.
14 Sabdullah T. Macabago v. Commission on Elections et al., G.R. No. 152163, November 18,
2002.
15 See Jurry Andal et al. v. People of the Philippines, et al., G.R. Nos. 138268-69, May 26,
1999 (en banc).
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agrarian reform program; 16 2) affirming the constitutional right to a fair and a
speedy trial; 17 3) affirming a lower court judgment finding the government's use of
arrest, detention, and/or deportation orders to be illegal and arbitrary;184) enjoining
the military and police's conduct of warrantless arrests and searches, 'aerial target
zonings' or 'saturation drives' in areas where alleged subversives were supposedly
hiding; 19 5) declaring search warrants defective and the ensuing seizure of private
properties to be illegal;2 0 6) acquitting a person whose conviction for murder was
based largely on an inadmissible extrajudicial confession (obtained without the
presence of counsel);2 1 7) upholding the dismissal of a criminal charge on the
basis of the constitutional right against double jeopardy;22 8) acquittal of a public
officer due to a violation of the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy
disposition of her case;2 3 9) prohibiting the compelled donation of print media
space to the Commission on Elections without payment of just compensation; 24
and 10) prohibiting governmental restrictions on the publication of election survey
results for unconstitutionally abridging the freedom of speech, expression, and the
press.25
16 Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 86889, December
4, 1990 (en banc).
17 Lisandro Abadia et al. v. Court of Appeals et al., G.R. No. 105597, September 23, 1994 (en
banc).
18 Andrea D. Domingo v. Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, G.R. No. 154745, January 29, 2004.
19 Eddie Guazon et al. v. Renato De Villa et al., G.R. No. 80508, January 30, 1990; See
among others People of the Philippines v. Melly Sarap, G.R. No. 132165, March 26, 2003; People
of the Philippines v. Noel P. Tudtud, et al., G.R. No. 144037, September 26, 2003; Rudy Caballes v.
Court of Appeals et al., G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002; People of the Philippines v. Nasario
Molina et al., G.R. No. 133917, February 19, 2001; People of the Philippines v. Rufino Gamer, G.R.
No. 115984, February 29, 2000.
20 Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan et al., G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003. See
among others People of the Philippines v. Loreto Salangga et al., G.R. No. 100910, July 25, 1994;
People of the Philippines v. Danilo Q. Simbahon, G.R. No. 132371, April 9, 2003.
21 People of the Philippines v. Elizar Tomaquin, G.R. No. 133188, July 23, 2004. See among
others People of the Philippines v. Joel Janson, et al., G.R. No. 125938, April 4, 2003; People of the
Philippines v. Roldan A. Ochate, G.R. No. 127154, July 30, 2002 (en banc); People of the
Philippines v. Sherjohn Arondain, G.R. Nos. 131864-65, September 27, 2001 (en banc); People of
the Philippines v. Domingo R. Muleta, G.R. No. 130189, June 25, 1999.
22 People v. Acelo Verra, G.R. No. 134732, May 29, 2002.
23 Imelda R. Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998 (en banc).
24 Philippine Press Institute Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 119694, May 22, 1995
(en banc).
25 Social Weather Stations Inc. et al. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 147571, May 5,
2001 (en banc). See also In Re Emil (Emiliano) P. Jurado Ex Rel: Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company (PLDT) per its First Vice-President, Mr. Vicente R. Samson, A.M. No. 93-2-
037 SC, April 6, 1995 (en banc).
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1.2.2. Expanded rule-making powers of the Supreme Court
Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution vests the Supreme Court
with the authority to promulgate rules 'concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights':
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
....(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar,
and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court."
The Supreme Court's authority to promulgate rules 'concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights' is a formulation unique to the
1987 Constitution, nowhere found in the rule-making power of the Court as
expressed in the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution.26 Philippine
Supreme Court Chief Justice Reynato Puno has publicly declared that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution purposely expanded the Court's rule-making
power in view of the fundamental importance of protecting individuals'
constitutionally-guaranteed rights:
"I respectfully submit further that the framers of the 1987
Constitution were gifted with a foresight that allowed them to see
that the dark forces of human rights violators would revisit our
country and wreak havoc on the rights of our people. With this all-
seeing eye, they embedded in our 1987 Constitution a new power
and vested it on our Supreme Court - the power to promulgate
rules to protect the constitutional rights of our people. This is a
radical departure from our 1935 and 1972 Constitutions, for the
power to promulgate rules or laws to protect the constitutional rights
of our people is essentially a legislative power, and yet it was given
to the judiciary, more specifically to the Supreme Court. If this is
disconcerting to foreign constitutional experts who embrace the
tenet that separation of powers is the cornerstone of democracy, it
is not so to Filipinos who survived the authoritarian years, 1971 to
1986. Those were the winter years of human rights in the
Philippines. They taught us the lesson that in the fight for human
26 See 1973 CONST., art. X, sec. 5(5); 1935 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 13.
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rights, it is the judiciary that is our last bulwark of defense; hence,
the people entrusted to the Supreme Court this right to promulgate
rules protecting their constitutional rights."27
The foregoing interpretation of the Court's expanded rule-making power
under the 1987 Constitution appears to have been adopted by the Court itself
outside of specific jurisprudential pronouncement. There is no case, to date,
that interprets the Constitutional intent behind the expansion of the Court's rule-
making power under the 1987 Constitution. However, when the Court
promulgated the Rule on the Writ of Amparo28 in October 2007, it also authorized
the release of the Annotation to the Writ of Amparo.29 In this Annotation, the
Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court stated in no uncertain terms that the
Supreme Court was purposely vested with this 'additional power' to protect and
enforce rights guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution:
"The 1987 Constitution enhanced the protection of human rights
by giving the Supreme Court the power to '[p]romulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights...'
This rule-making power unique to the present Constitution, is the
result of our experience under the dark years of the martial law
regime. Heretofore, the protection of constitutional rights was
principally lodged with Congress through the enactment of laws and
their implementing rules and regulation. The 1987 Constitution,
however, gave the Supreme Court the additional power to promulgate
rules to protect and enforce rights guaranteed by the fundamental law
of the land.
In light of the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced
disappearances, the Supreme Court resolved to exercise for the first
time its power to promulgate rules to protect our people's
constitutional rights. Its Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court
agreed that the writ of amparo should not be as comprehensive and
all-encompassing as the ones found in some American countries,
especially Mexico. xxx The Committee decided that in our
jurisdiction, this writ of amparo should be allowed to evolve through
27 Puno, Reynato S., "No Turning Back on Human Rights", speech delivered on Aug. 25 2007
at Silliman University, Dumaguete City, Philippines. Full text at:
http://ia341243.us.archive.orq/3/items/TextOfChiefJusticeReynatoPunoSillimanSpeech/PunoOnHu
manRiqhts.doc (last visited 5 May 2008).
28 The Writ of Amparo is a form of judicial relief "available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity", and applies to "extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof'. See full text at
http://www.supremecourt.qov.phlRULE AMPARO.pdf (last visited 15 May 2008).
29 Full text at http://www.supremecourt.qov.phlAnnotation amparo.pdf (last visited 5 May
2008).
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time and jurisprudence and through substantive laws as they may be
promulgated by Congress." 30
Significantly, the Annotation does not refer to any portion of the Record of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission that explains the expansion of the Court's
rule-making power. Given the Court's pronouncement in this Annotation, however,
it appears unlikely that the Court would countermand its own interpretation of the
expansion of its rule-making power under the 1987 Constitution. This
interpretation of the Court's expanded rule-making power could similarly explain
the Court's promulgation of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data in January
2008.31
1.2.3. Provisions for Impeachment of Public Officers
Article Xl of the 1987 Constitution amplifies, in greater detail than previous
constitutions, the Filipino citizen's direct remedy of impeachment of high
constitutional officers such as the President, the Vice-President, the members of
the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman:
"Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives.
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment.
Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any member of
the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee
within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a
majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within
sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
30 Id., at pp. 2-3.
31 See A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC ("Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data"). Full text at:
http://www.supremecourt.qiov.p~h/rulesofcourt/2008/lan/A. M. No.08-1-16-SC.p~df (last visited 5 May
2008).
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Impeachment of the Committee, or overrule its contrary resolution. The vote
of each member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed
by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith
proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath
or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person
shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of
the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic
of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and
subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section."32
In British legal history, impeachment was a method first used by the House of
Commons in 1376 to 'control royal ministers through a judicial process conducted
outside the regular royal courts', 'in order to prosecute ministers of state whom the
king refused to prosecute'.3 3 (This was axiomatic for the English constitutional
structure where the Prime Minister and his cabinet were accountable to the
sovereignty of Parliament.) The English device of impeachment influenced the
framers of the US Constitution, which in turn influenced the drafting of the initial
constitutional provisions on impeachment under Article IX of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution. The impeachment process, recently tested against former President
Joseph Estrada, has never been pursued to its conclusion or final termination.
The traditional concept of limiting sovereign power 'outside' of judicial
intervention would, however, be radicalized in the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
While impeachment is traditionally conceptualized as a political act,34 in the
32 CONST., art. XI, secs. 1-3(8). Emphasis supplied. See also Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules), 12th Congress, November 28, 2001; Rules
of Procedure on Impeachment Trials in the Senate of the Philippines, Senate Resolution No. 890, at
http://www.chanrobles.com/leqall l impeachmentrules.htm (last visited 15 May 2008); TUPAZ,
ANTONIO R. and A. EDSEL C.F. TUPAZ, FUNDAMENTALS ON IMPEACHMENT, (2001 ed.,
Central Lawbook Publishing, Quezon City).
33 Seidman, Guy 1., "The Origins of Accountability: Everything I Know About the Sovereign's
Immunity, I Learned from King Henry Ill", 49 St. Louis U. L.J. 393 (Winter 2005), at 446-449.
34 JODY C. BAUMGARTNER and NAOKO KADA (eds.), CHECKING EXECUTIVE POWER:
PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, (2003 ed., Praeger); See
Hull, N.E.H. and Peter Charles Hoffer, "Historians and the Impeachment Imbroglio: In Search of a
Serviceable History", 31 Rutgers L.J. 473 (Winter 2000).
438
Philippines under the 1987 Constitution, the political origins and nature of the
impeachment process could still be subject to judicial review. According to the
Supreme Court, this peculiarity was purposely intended by the 1986 Constitutional
Commission in view of the expansion of the Supreme Court's power of judicial
review. In a 2003 ruling involving a second impeachment complaint filed against
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court within the one-year bar in the 1987
Constitution, 3 5 the Philippine Supreme Court expressly declared that impeachment
proceedings are within the scope of its expanded power of judicial review under
the 1987 Constitution.36 The Court stated that the 1987 Constitution "did not
intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress.
Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits...through the power of judicial
review." Impeachment could not be deemed as a purely political action, unlike in
the United States legal tradition since it was not a 'truly political question'. The
Court held that the test of the existence of a 'truly political question' which would
prevent it from exercising judicial review "lies in the answer to the question of
whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred
upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine
whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits."37
1.2.4. Special Constitutional Offices such as the Office of the
Ombudsman and the Commission on Human Rights
The 1987 Constitution created two special constitutional offices to: 1) give
Filipino individuals additional modes of direct recourse in case of violations of their
fundamental rights; and 2) operationalize the constitutional policy on transparency
of government transactions and accountability of public officers. The Office of the
Ombudsman, dubbed as "protector of the people" under the 1987 Constitution,
designed as a powerful independent constitutional office, with vast powers,
including the authority to prosecute and administratively discipline public officers,
and recommend the impeachment of constitutional officers. On the other hand,
the Commission on Human Rights was created as an independent constitutional
35 Based on its close interpretation of the Constitutional text and intent from 1986
Constitutional Commission records, the Court held that the second impeachment complaint filed by
two legislators against the Chief Justice violated the constitutional prohibition against the initiation
of impeachment proceedings against the same officer within a one-year period.
36 Id.
37 Id. To address the concern of the political branches against arbitrary encroachments by
the judiciary, the Court stated that it had itself developed guidelines in the exercise of its expanded
power of judicial review: 1) existence of an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise ofjudicial power; 2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement; 3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; 4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very ls mota of the case.
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office to fulfill monitoring, fact-finding, and reportorial functions in relation to human
rights violations in the Philippines:38
"Article XI
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
... Sec.5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the
Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as
Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for
Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military
establishment may likewise be appointed.
Sec. 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the
Ombudsman, other than the Deputies, shall be appointed by the
Ombudsman according to the Civil Service Law.
Sec. 7. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the
Office of the Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and
exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except
those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this
Constitution.
Sec.8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines, and at the time of their appointment, at least
forty years old, of recognized probity and independence, and members
of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any
elective office in the immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman
must have for ten years or more been a judge or engaged in the practice
of law in the Philippines.
During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same
disqualifications and prohibitions as provided for in Section 2 of Article
IX-A of this Constitution.
Sec.9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial
and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy
thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All
vacancies shall be filled within three months after they occur.
Sec. 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank of
Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Constitutional
Commissions, and they shall receive the same salary, which shall not be
decreased during their term of office.
38 CONST., art. XI, secs. 5-14; art. XIII, secs. 17-19.
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Sec. 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term
of seven years without reappointment. They shall not be qualified to run
for any office in the election immediately succeeding their cessation from
office.
Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the
people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials or employees of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify
the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or upon complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official
or employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or
controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and
expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and
correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a
public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure
compliance therewith.
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish
it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions
entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of
public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the
Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information
necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities and to examine,
if necessary, pertinent records and documents.
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when
circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.
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(7) Determine the cause of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement,
fraud, and corruption in the Government and make
recommendations for their elimination and the observance of
high standards of ethics and efficiency.
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other
powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided
by law.
Sec. 14. The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Its approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly
released....
Article XIII
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
... Sec. 17. (1) There is hereby created an independent office called
the Commission on Human Rights.
(2) The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four
Members who must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and a
majority of whom shall be members of the Bar. The term of office and
other qualifications and disabilities of the Members of the Commission
shall be provided by law.
(3) Until this Commission is constituted, the existing Presidential
Committee on Human Rights shall continue to exercise its present
functions and powers.
(4) The approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be
automatically and regularly released.
Sec.18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following
powers and functions:
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights;
(2)Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedures, and cite
for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human
rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing
abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to
the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention
facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and
information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
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(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote
human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of
human rights or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with
international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony
or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or
under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or
agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appointment of its officers and employees in accordance with
law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by
law.
Sec. 19. The Congress may provide for other cases of violations of
human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission,
taking into account its recommendations."
The concept of an Ombudsman owes its origins to Sweden's 1809
Constitution.3 9 The Swedish Ombudsman was an institution thought to be derived
from Roman antecedents (e.g. the tribuni plebis of ancient Rome). While the
Office of the Ombudsman appeared 'antagonistic' to the strict doctrine of
separation of powers, the Swedish Ombudsman served the interests of the
'Estates of the Realm' only to the extent that "as an officer elected by Parliament,
he could institute proceedings against officials and judges; but the trial of these
actions was to be before the general courts, which were largely independent of
Parliament."4 0 The Swedish Ombudsman was "part of the network of controls
which include the right of citizens to have access to all public documents within
certain statutory exceptions designed for the protection of public and private
information which is rightly secret, the power of private individuals to institute
proceedings against officials for faults committed in the exercise of their duties,
and the concomitant personal liability of officials for damages in cases where
prejudice to the interests of private citizens has resulted from dereliction of duty."4 1
The Philippine Ombudsman, however, is intended by the 1986 Constitutional
Commission to be a stronger and more independent constitutional check against
governmental power than the classical Swedish conception. There are only two
39 See Carlota, Salvador T., "The Ombudsman: Its Effectivity and Visibility Amidst
Bureaucratic Abuse and Irregularity", 65 Phil. L. J. 12, (1990).
40 Jagerskiild, Stig, "The Swedish Ombudsman", 109 Univ. Penn. L. Rev. 8, 1077-1099 (Jun.,
1961), at 1079.
41 Id. at 1080. See also Bull, Thomas, "The Original Ombudsman: Blueprint in Need of
Revision or a Concept with More to Offer?", 6 Eur. Pub. L. 3, at 334-344 (1995).
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institutions explicitly designated under the 1987 Constitution as 'protectors of the
people' --- the Office of the Ombudsman, on the one hand, and the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, on the other.42 As records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission show, this is not coincidental phraseology:43
"MR. MONSOD
Madam President, perhaps it might be helpful if we give the spirit and
intendment of the Committee. What we wanted to avoid is the situation
where it deteriorates into a prosecution arm. We wanted to give the idea
of the Ombudsman a chance, with prestige and persuasive powers,
and also a chance to really function as a champion of the citizen.
However, we do not want to foreclose the possibility that in the future,
the Assembly, as it may see fit, may have to give additional powers to the
Ombudsman; we want to give the concept of a pure Ombudsman a chance
under the Constitution.
MR. RODRIGO:
Madam President, what I am worried about is if we create a
constitutional body which has neither punitive nor prosecutory powers but
only persuasive powers, we might be raising the hopes of our people too
much and then disappoint them.
MR. MONSOD:
I agree with the Commissioner.
MR. RODRIGO:
Anyway, since we state that the powers of the Ombudsman can later
on be implemented by the legislature, why not leave this to the legislature?
MR. MONSOD.
Yes, because we want to avoid what happened in 1973. I read the
committee report which recommended the approval of the 27 resolutions for
the creation of the office of the Ombudsman, but notwithstanding the explicit
purpose enunciated in that report, the implementing law --- the last one,
42 CONST., art. XI, sec. 12; art. II, sec. 3.
43 Ronaldo P. Ledesma v. Court of Appeals et al., G.R. No. 161629, July 29, 2005, citing
Camanag v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 121017, February 17, 1997, citing II Record of the Constitutional
Commission 268 (1986).
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P.D. No. 1630 --- did not follow the main thrust; instead it created the
Tanodbayan...
MR. MONSOD (reacting to statements of Commissioner Bias Ople):
May we just state that perhaps the honorable Commissioner has looked
at it in too much of an absolutist position. The Ombudsman is seen as a
civil advocate or a champion of citizens against the bureaucracy, not
against the President. On one hand, we are told he has no teeth and he
lacks other things. On the other hand, there is the interpretation that he is a
competitor to the President, as if he is being brought up to the same level as
the President.
With respect to the argument that he is a toothless animal, we would
like to say that we are promoting the concept in its form at the present, but
we are also saying that he can exercise such powers and functions as may
be provided by law in accordance with the thinking of Commissioner
Rodrigo. We did not think that at this time we should prescribe this, but we
leave it up to Congress at some future time if it feels that it may need to
designate what powers the Ombudsman may need in order that he be more
effective. This is not foreclosed."
The Philippine Legislature magnified the powers of the Ombudsman in
Republic Act No. 6770 ('Ombudsman Act of 1989') which explicitly provided the
Ombudsman with prosecutorial functions. Reading the 1987 Constitution along
with the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Supreme Court describes the Philippine
Ombudsman as "depart[ing] from the classical Ombudsman model whose function
is merely to receive and process the people's complaints against corrupt and
abusive government personnel. The Philippine Ombudsman, as protector of the
people, is armed with the power to prosecute erring public officers and employees,
giving him an active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt
practices and such other offenses that may be committed by such officers and
employees. The legislature has vested him with broad powers to enable him to
implement his own actions..."44
Much of the body of jurisprudence that has evolved from the creation of the
Office of the Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution involves questions on the
scope of the Ombudsman's administrative authority and prosecutorial jurisdiction
over public officers at various levels of the Philippine government hierarchy.45 (The
44 George Uy v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 105965-70, March 20, 2001 (en banc). the
Court noted dictator Ferdinand Marcos' attempt to create the Ombudsman during Martial Law rule,
but whose prosecutorial functions were supervised by Marcos' own Secretary of Justice.
45 For (re)statements of the Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary authority, see among
others Erlinda F. Santos v. Ma. Carest A. Rasalan, G.R. No. 155749, February 8, 2007; Office of
the Ombudsman v. Heidi M. Estandarte et al., G.R. No. 168670, April 13, 2007; Corazon C.
Balbastro v. Nestor Junio et al., G.R. No. 154678, July 17, 2007. For clarifications on the
Ombudsman's prosecutorial powers, see among others
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most high-profile of which is the criminal prosecution of former President Joseph
Estrada, made possible after the Supreme Court declared him to have already
'constructively resigned' from office.46) Despite its expanded judicial review
powers, however, the Supreme Court has generally exercised a voluntary 'policy of
non-interference' in the Ombudsman's constitutionally-mandated investigatory and
prosecutorial powers, unless for 'good and compelling reasons'. The Court
explains its policy as a mode of 'respect' for the constitutionally-mandated initiative
and independence inherent in the Ombudsman, who, 'beholden to no one, acts as
the champion of the people and the preserver of integrity in the public service'.4 7
This is unique in light of consistent judicial opinion that the Ombudsman is an
institution constitutionally designed precisely to give individuals direct recourse and
remedial means against abusive excesses of governmental power.48
In contrast, however, the Supreme Court's judicial interpretation has served
to restrict the powers and authority of the Commission of Human Rights. In Isidro
Carinfo et aL v. Commission on Human Rights et aL, the unanimous Court clarified
that the Commission's power to 'investigate all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights' did not extend to adjudication or resolution of
cases involving human rights violations.4 9 This reduced the Commission to a fact-
finding body, with no authority to hear and decide cases whether in a quasi-judicial
or judicial capacity. The Court also recently qualified the scope of the
Commission's fiscal autonomy only to "the privilege of having its approved annual
appropriations released automatically and regularly", withholding from it the broad
fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, Constitutional Commissions, and the
Office of the Ombudsman.50
46 Joseph E. Estrada v. Aniano Desierto in his capacity as Ombudsman, et al., G.R. Nos.
146710-15, and Joseph E. Estrada v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001
(en banc); Joseph E. Estrada v. Aniano Desierto et al., G.R. Nos. 146710-15, Joseph E. Estrada v.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, April 3, 2001 (en banc); See Joseph E. Estrada v.
Aniano A. Desierto et al., G.R. No. 156160, December 9, 2004 (en banc).
47 Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto et al., G.R. No. 136192, August 14, 2001 (en banc).
48 See among others Jose M. Galario v. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao) et al., G.R. No.
166797, July 10, 2007; Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals et al., G.R. No. 160675, June
16, 2006; Gregorio B. Honasan II v. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice
et al., G.R. No. 159747, April 13, 2004; Manuel C. Roxas et al. v. Conrado M. Vasquez et al., G.R.
No. 114944, June 19, 2001; Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Aniano A. Desierto et al., G.R. No. 130140, October 25, 1999; Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L.
Pascasio, et al., G.R. No. 118141, September 5, 1997; Amor D. Deloso v. Manuel C. Domingo et
al., G.R. No. 90591, November 21, 1990.
49 ISidro Carino et al. v. Commission on Human Rights et al., G.R. No. 96681, December 2,
1991 (en banc).
so Commission on Human Rights Employees' Association v. Commission on Human Rights,
G.R. No. 155336, July 21, 2006.
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1.2.5. Multiparty and Party-list systems in Philippine elections
Abjuring political despotism under the Marcos regime, the 1987 Constitution
prescribes a free and open electoral party system. It abolished the two-party
system under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions that supposedly entrenched
political dynasties along bipartisan lines. Alongside the multiparty system, the
1986 Constitutional Commission also created a party-list system to ensure
representation of economically and socially disadvantaged sectors in the Philippine
Congress, and as a means to counteract the proliferation of political dynasties.5 1
Article II, Section 26; Article VI, Sections 5(1) and 5(2); and Article IX-C, Sections
6, 7, and 8 of the 1987 Constitution jointly reflect the Constitutional policy towards
wide and open representation, to wit:
"ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for
public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
ARTICLE VI
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
II Record of the Constitutional Commission 256. See Victorino Dennis M. Socrates v.
Commission on Elections et al., G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683, 155083-84, November 12, 2002,(Puno, J., concurring opinion), citing Constitutional Commissioner Blas M. Ople:
"I think the veterans of the Senate and of the House of Representatives here will say that
simply getting nominated on a party ticket is a very poor assurance that the people will return
them to the Senate or to the House of Representatives. There are many casualties along the way
of those who want to return to their office, and it is the people's decision that matters....
...I think we already have succeeded in striking a balance of policies, so that the structures,
about which Commissioner Garcia expressed a very legitimate concern, could henceforth develop
to redistribute opportunities, both in terms of political and economic power, to the great majority of
the people, because very soon, we will also discuss the multiparty system. We have unshackled
Philippine politics from the two-party system, which really was the most critical support for the
perpetuation of political dynasties in the Philippines. That is quite a victory, but at the same time,
let us not despise the role of political parties. The strength of democracy will depend a lot on how
strong our democratic parties are, and a splintering of all these parties so that we fall back on, let
us say, nontraditional parties entirely will mean a great loss to the vitality and resiliency of our
democracy..."
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through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of
the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For
three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of
the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by
law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector...
ARTICLE IX
C. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Sec. 6. A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve
according to the free choice of the people, subject to provisions of this Article.
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or
coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system
as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under
the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration
boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar
bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in
accordance with law."52
The party-list system gives a voter the opportunity to cast two votes for the
House of Representatives --- one for the congressman representing the voter's
legislative district, and another for a party-list representative.5 3 In Veterans
Federation Party et al. v. Commission on Elections, et al.,54 the Supreme Court
held that the twenty per centum party-list representation indicated in Article VI,
52 CONST., art. II, sec. 26; art. VI, secs. 5(1) and 5(2); art. IX-C, secs. 6, 7, and 8.
53 Republic Act No. 7941 (otherwise known as the Party List System Act); Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections et al., G.R. Nos. 147589 and 147613, June
26, 2001 (en banc); See Tangkia, Fritzie Palma and Ma. Araceli Basco Habaradas, "Party-List
System: the Philippine Experience", at http://www.fes.orq.ph/papers partylist.htm (last visited 1
May 2008).
54 Veterans Federation Party et al. v. Commission on Elections et al., G.R. Nos. 136781,
136786, and 136795, October 6, 2000 (en banc). The Court chose not to adopt the German
Bundestag's Niemeyer formula for allocating excess seats among parties meeting (and exceeding)
the two percent threshold. Additional seats for each qualifying party are determined according to
the following formula: Additional seat(s) = [No. of votes of concerned party I No. of votes of first
party ] x No. of additional seats allocated to the first party
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Section 5(2) of the 1987 Constitution comprises a mere 'ceiling' in the allocation of
total number of House seats. What is mandatory is that the party should have at
least two percent of the total valid votes cast under the party-list system to garner
a seat in the House, on the theory that, "to have meaningful representation, the
elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people.
Otherwise... the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are
incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat
to the stability of Congress."55  Each qualified party that meets the two percent
threshold is entitled to additional seats, but cannot exceed three seats in total.
The multiparty system has been critiqued for creating more partisan
fragmentation in Philippine presidential elections, resulting in governments with
'weak' mandates from the voter population. As Jungug Choi observes,"[t]he
Philippines is the only presidential democracy in the world using a plurality-rule
electoral system to select its chief executive that has experienced a dramatic
change in that system. The change altered the effective number of presidential
candidates that participated in the vote." 56 The correlation between the multiparty
system and democratic (in)stability in the Philippines, however, does not seem at
all straightforward,57 especially when other variables (e.g. differentiation of political
elites, access to political capital and opportunities, nature of membership and
leadership of political parties, absence of substantial ideological differences among
parties) are taken into account.58 Nonetheless, for purposes of scrutinizing
constitutional design, it appears that the free and open party system,
complemented with a partylist system for groups traditionally disenfranchised by
lack of political or economic resources, was also envisaged by the 1986
Constitutional Commission as popular sovereignty mechanisms to redistribute
governmental power, and thus guard against excessive concentration of political
power, most especially in the executive branch.
5s Id.
56 Choi, Jungug, "Philippine Democracies Old and New: Elections, Term Limits, and Party
Systems", Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 3, (May- June 2001), pp. 488-501.
57 The minority presidency of Fidel V. Ramos might appear more 'stable' than the
overwhelming landslide majority victory of Joseph Estrada, whose presidency was cut short with his
ouster in 2001. For a discussion of political competition and democratic transitions, See Wright,
Frank, "Political Competition and Democratic Stability in New Democracies", B.J. Pol. S.38, 221-
245, Cambridge University Press 2008.
58 See Rocamora, Joel, "Philippine Political Parties, Electoral System, and Political Reform",
Philippines International Review, Volume 1, No. 1, 1998; Schock, Kurt, "People Power and Political
Opportunities: Social Movement Mobilization and Outcomes in the Philippines and Burma", Social
Problems, Vol. 46, No. 3, (Aug. 1999), pp. 355-375, University of California Press.
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1.2.6. Direct exercise of popular sovereignty by the people: Plebiscite,
Initiative, Recall, and Referendum
Apart from expanding the space for the Filipino people's participation in their
choice of delegates to whom sovereign powers of government would be entrusted,
the 1987 Constitution also provided other avenues for the Filipino people to
directly exercise their popular sovereignty. Considering the ease by which the
Marcos dictatorship was able to entrench itself in power through power
redistributions that were almost unilaterally effected by an inordinately strong
executive branch, the 1986 Constitutional Commission was assiduous in ensuring
an expanded democratic space that restored the primacy of the people's sovereign
authority. The following provisions of the Constitution provide for the authority of
the Filipino people to: 1) ratify proposed amendments to the Constitution
(Plebiscite); 2) directly propose amendments to the Constitution (Initiative); 3)
directly remove a local government official for loss of confidence (Recall); 4)
directly approve, amend, or reject any local ordinance passed by local legislatures
or sanggunians (Referendum):
"ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be
proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec.2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve
per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered votes therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor
oftener than one every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of
this right.
Sec.3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members,
call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members,
submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention.
Sec.4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under
Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than
ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
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Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier
than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the Certification by the
Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.
ARTICLE X
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide
for the qualifications, election, appointment, and removal, term, salaries,
powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of local units."
Chief Justice Reynato Puno stresses that the foregoing provisions
'institutionalized the people's might made palpable in the 1986 People Power
Revolution'. 5 9 He notes the following excerpts from the Records of the 1986
Constitutional Commission to show the deliberate intent to establish the
Philippines as a democratic, and not just republican, state:
"MR. SUAREZ. ... May I call attention to Section 1. I wonder who among
the members of the committee would like to clarify this question regarding
the use of the word "democratic" in addition to the word "republican". Can
the honorable members of the committee give us the reason or reasons for
introducing this additional expression. Would the committee not be satisfied
with the use of the word "republican"? What prompted it to include the word
"democratic"?.
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think as a lawyer, the Commissioner
knows that one of the manifestations of republicanism is the existence of the
Bill of Rights and periodic elections, which already indicates that we are a
democratic state. Therefore the addition of "democratic" is what we call a
"pardonable redundancy" the purpose being to emphasize that our country
is republican and democratic at the same time... In the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, "democratic" does not appear. I hope the Commissioner has
no objection to that word.
59 Arturo M. Tolentino et al. v. Commission on Elections et al., G.R. No. 148334, January 21,
2004 (Puno, J., dissenting opinion).
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MR. SUAREZ. No, I would not die for that. If it is redundant in character
but it is for emphasis of the people's rights, I would have no objection. I am
only trying to clarify the matter. (citing 4 Records of the Constitutional
Commission, p. 680) ...
MR. NOLLEDO. I am putting the word "democratic" because of the
provisions that we are now adopting which are covering consultations with
the people. For example, we have provisions on recall, initiative, the right of
the people even to participate in lawmaking and other instances that
recognize the validity of interference by the people through people's
organizations... (citing 4 Records of the Constitutional Commission, p. 735)
MR. OPLE. The Committee added the word "democratic" to "republican",
and therefore, the first sentence states: 'The Philippines is a republican and
democratic state.' May I know from the committee the reason for adding the
word 'democratic' to 'republican'? The constitutional framers of the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions were content with 'republican'. Was this done
merely for sake of emphasis?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, that question has been asked several
times, but being the proponent of this amendment, I would like the
Commissioner to know that "democratic" was added because of the need to
emphasize people power and the many provisions in the Constitution that
we have approved related to recall, people's organizations, initiative, and
the like, which recognize the participation of the people in policy-making in
certain circumstances.
MR. OPLE. I thank the Commissioner. That is a very clear answer and I
think it does meet a need...
MR. NOLLEDO. According to Commissioner Rosario Braid, "democracy"
here is understood as participatory democracy. (citing 4 Records of the
Constitutional Commission, p. 752).
MR. SARMIENTO. When we speak of republican democratic state, are we
referring to representative democracy?
MR. AZCUNA. That is right.
MR. SARMIENTO. So why do we not retain the old formulation under the
1973 and 1935 Constitutions which used the words "republican state"
because "republican state" would refer to a democratic state where people
choose their representatives?
MR. AZCUNA. We wanted to emphasize the participation of the people in
government.
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MR. SARMIENTO. But even in the concept "republican state", we are
stressing the participation of the people... So the word "republican" will
suffice to cover popular representation.
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, the Commissioner is right. However, the committee
felt that in view of the introduction of the aspects of direct democracy such
as initiative, referendum, or recall, it was necessary to emphasize the
democratic portion of republicanism, of representative democracy as well
So, we want to add the word "democratic" to emphasize that in this new
Constitution there are instances where the people would act directly, and
not through their representatives. (citing 4 Records of the Constitutional
Commission, p. 769)."160
The introduction of new 'direct democracy' mechanisms in the 1987
Constitution such as initiative, recall, and referendum does not, however, preclude
the exercise of judicial review on the propriety of the exercise of such mechanisms.
The Supreme Court's expanded power of judicial review has been appealed to, in
many instances, to question the consistency of the ostensibly 'direct democratic'
action with Constitutional proscriptions.61 In Raul L. Lambino et al v. Commission
on Elections,62 which involved a recent attempt at Constitutional 'revision' through
people's initiative, the Supreme Court held that the petition (proposing a change
from the current bicameral presidential system to a unicameral parliamentary
system) was constitutionally infirm for failing to comply with the required
presentation of proposed constitutional amendments to all signatories of the
proposed initiative, and most importantly, for wrongly using a people's initiative to
actually propose substantial revisions and not mere amendments to the
Constitution. Speaking for the Court, Justice Antonio Carpio strenuously
emphasized that this mode of direct democracy was not to be trifled with for
spurious political purposes:
"The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the
utmost respect and obedience of all the citizens of this nation. No one
can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in
blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of amendment and
revision laid down in the Constitution itself.
60 Id. Emphasis supplied.
61 See Jose C. Miranda et al. v. Hon. Alexander Aguirre, et al., G.R. No. 133064, September
16, 1999 (en banc); Alan Peter S. Cayetano v. Commission on Elections et al., G.R. Nos. 166388
and 166652, January 23, 2006 (en banc); Enrique T. Garcia et al. v. Commission on Elections et
al., G.R. No. 111511, October 5, 1993; Miriam Defensor Santiago et al. v. Commission on Elections
et al., G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997 (en banc).
62 Raul L. Lambino et al. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 174153 and 174299, October
25, 2006 (en banc).
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To allow such a change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the
Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned by every
dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier
change in the Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed
modes, tomorrow the new dominant political group that comes will
demand its own set of changes in the same cavalier and
unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur
well for the rule of law in this country.
An overwhelming majority --- 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3
percent of the total votes cast --- approved our Constitution in a national
plebiscite held on 11 February 1987. That approval is the unmistakable
voice of the people, the full expression of the people's sovereign will.
That approval included the prescribed modes for amending or revising
the Constitution.
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures
gathered by the Lambino Group, can change our Constitution contrary
to the specific modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity,
prescribed when they ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an
extra-constitutional change, which means subverting the people's
sovereign will and discarding the Constitution. This is one act the Court
cannot and should never do. As the ultimate guardian of the
Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend
and protect the Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign will of
the people."
The above six mechanisms are specific innovations of the 1987 Constitution
that provide transformative avenues for the broad and general mass of Filipino
individuals to restrain the excesses of executive power. While there are many
other deviceS63 already present in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions (and likewise
reproduced in the 1987 Constitution) which traditionally serve as checks on the
executive, I purposely draw attention to the above mechanisms to emphasize the
1986 Constitutional Commission's simultaneous policies of: 1) direct inclusion of
Filipino individuals in the processes of executive accountability; and 2) direct
63 The separation of powers doctrine, legislative power of ratification of treaties, legislative
power of the 'purse' and of the 'sword', legislative check (through the Commission on
Appointments) on the President's appointment power, to name a few, have long featured in
Philippine constitutional development. See Arturo M. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance et al., G.R.
Nos. 115455, 115525, 115543, 115544, 115754, 115781, 115852, 115873, 115931, August 25,
1994 (en banc), (" The exercise of the treaty-ratifying power is not the exercise of legislative power
It is the exercise of a check on the executive power"); Jesulito A. Manalo v. Pedro G. Sistoza et al.,
G.R. No. 107369, August 11, 1999 (en banc), ("The framers of the 1987 Constitution deemed it
imperative to subject certain high positions in the government to the power of confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments and to allow other positions within the exclusive appointing power of
the President.'); Miriam Defensor Santiago et al. v. Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. et al., G.R. No.
134577, November 18, 1998 (en banc), see concurring opinion of Justice Jose C. Vitug.
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participation in decision-making and judgment-forming in the political collective,
bypassing the agency of the Executive Branch. Direct inclusion is seen from the
means by which the 1987 Constitution enables Filipino individuals (and without
need of affiliation in any political substratum or grouping) to: 1) directly file petitions
with courts to assail and annul executive actions devised or exercised with "grave
abuse of discretion"; 2) file a verified complaint for impeachment (with
endorsement of a Member of the House) against high constitutional officers, all the
way to the President; or 3) seek the assistance of the Office of the Ombudsman to
compel public officials' performance of their duties, investigate anomalous uses of
public funds, and prosecute errant and abusive government officials, among
others. On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution enables direct participation of
Filipino individuals in: 1) the choice of their governors when representation is
meaningfully widened through an open electoral system complemented with a
party-list system; and 2) the direct exercise of collective judgment in the
fundamental organization of the polity (e.g. ratification of constitutional
amendments by plebiscite; direct proposal of constitutional amendments by
initiative; approval or rejection of local ordinances through referendum) and the
political legitimacy of those in public office (e.g. recall elections at the local
government level).
Clearly, what is implicit from the 1986 Constitutional Commission's twin
policies of direct inclusion and direct participation is the highest status accorded by
the framers to Filipinos' individual rationalities in determining and legitimating
decisions in their political community. Indubitably, it is universalist contractarian
thought that predominates when the 1987 Constitution holds as its core principle
that "[t]he prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people", and
lays the State's policy to "value the dignity of every human person and guarantee
full respect for human rights".64 Core principle and State policy converge to jointly
create the template for direct inclusion and direct participation of Filipino
individuals in shaping public order.
Given the universalist design of the 1987 Constitution, which dilutes (if not
removes in some instances) the traditional powers exercised by the people's
representatives, we must also consider that this individual rationality-driven
process of shaping public order has now become subject to judicial capture. Given
the expanded powers of judicial review under the 1987 Constitution, the role of the
judiciary in its constitutional reading of Filipino individuals' direct inclusion and
direct participation becomes equally vital with its constitutional reading of the
validity of the exercise of executive power. Under the 1987 Constitution, the
Supreme Court now acts as a sort of political gatekeeper in mediating the lines of
entry and access to sovereign power, and who (the people vis-a-vis their
representatives) can properly wield such power in specific controversies. As the
final arbiter of an ever-widening realm of controversies (due to the emasculation of
the political question doctrine), the Supreme Court appears to have been entrusted
64 CONST., art. II, secs. 4 and 11.
455
by framers of the 1987 Constitution with the duty to define and interpret our
political spaces --- doing so while simultaneously avoiding a renewal of executive
entrenchment and arbitrariness under the Marcos regime, as well as Alexis De
Tocqueville's fear of the "tyranny of the majority" in democracies.6 5
This returns us squarely to the counter-majoritarian concerns prior to the
promulgation of the 1987 Constitution. Since the 1986 Constitutional Commission
vested the Supreme Court with expanded powers of judicial review, the Court, in
effect, is in the most significant position to deal with the 'mob rule' and 'weak state'
criticisms against the 1987 Constitution. It is a position that alternately makes the
Court vulnerable to charges of 'excessive judicial restraint' or 'unwarranted judicial
activism'. Chief Justice Reynato Puno explains at length the inherent tensions in
this constitutional role of the Supreme Court but asserts, however, that neither
philosophy is exclusive under the 1987 Constitution:
"Judicial restraint assumes a setting of a government that is
democratic and republican in character. Within this democratic and
republican framework, both the apostles of judicial restraint and the
disciples of judicial activism agree that government cannot act beyond
the outer limits demarcated by constitutional boundaries without
becoming subject to judicial intervention. The issue that splits them is
the location of those limits. They are divided in delineating the territory
within which government can function free of judicial intervention...
Judicial restraint thus gives due deference to the judiciary's co-
equal political branches of government comprised of democratically
elected officials and lawmakers, and encourages separation of powers.
It is consistent and congruent with the concept of balance of power
among the three independent branches of government. It does not only
recognize the equality of the other two branches with the judiciary, but
fosters that equality by minimizing inter-branch interference by the
judiciary...
Adherents of judicial restraint warn that under certain
circumstances, the active use of judicial review has a detrimental effect
on the capacity of the democratic system to function effectively.
Restraintists hold that large-scale reliance upon the courts for
resolution of public problems could lead in the long run to atrophy of
popular government and collapse of the broad-based political coalitions
and popular accountability that are the lifeblood of the democratic
system. They allege that aggressive judicial review saps the vitality
from constitutional debate in the legislature. It leads to democratic
65 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, (1900 ed., Colonial Press, New
York); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE OLD REGIME AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION,
(translation by Stuart Gilbert), (1983 ed., Doubleday).
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debilitation where the legislature and the people lose the ability to
engage in informed discourse about constitutional norms.
Judicial restraint, however, is not without its criticisms. Its
unbelievers insist that the concept of democracy must include
recognition of those rights that make it possible for minorities to
become majorities. They charge that restraintists forget that minority
rights are just as important a component of the democratic equation as
majority rule is. They submit that if the Court uses its power of judicial
review to guarantee rights fundamental to the democratic process ---
freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association and the right to
suffrage --- so that citizens can form political coalitions and influence
the making of public policy, then the Court would be just as 'democratic'
as Congress...
I most respectfully submit, however, that the 1987 Constitution
adopted neither judicial restraint nor judicial activism as a political
philosophy to the exclusion of each other. The expanded definition of
judicial power gives the Court enough elbow room to be more activist in
dealing with political questions but did not necessarily junk restraint in
resolving them. Political questions are not undifferentiated questions.
They are of a different variety.
The antagonism between judicial restraint and judicial activism is
avoided by the coordinacy theory of constitutional interpretation. This
coordinacy theory gives room for judicial restraint without allowing the
judiciary to abdicate its constitutionally mandated duty to interpret the
constitution. Coordinacy theory rests on the premise that within the
constitutional system, each branch of government has an independent
obligation to interpret the Constitution. This obligation is rooted on the
system of separation of powers. The oath to 'support this Constitution'
--- which the constitution mandates judges, legislators, and executives
to take --- proves this independent obligation. Thus, the coordinacy
theory accommodates judicial restraint because it recognizes that the
President and Congress also have an obligation to interpret the
constitution. In fine, the Court, under the coordinacy theory, considers
the preceding constitutional judgments made by other branches of
government. By no means, however, does it signify complete judicial
deference. Coordinacy means courts listen to the voice of the
President and Congress but their voice does not silence the judiciary.
The doctrine in Marbury v. Madison that courts are not bound by the
constitutional interpretation of other branches of government still rings
true. As well stated, 'the coordinacy thesis is quite compatible with a
judicial deference that accommodates the views of other branches,
while not amounting to an abdication of judicial review.
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With due respect, I cannot take the extreme position of judicial
restraint that always defers on the one hand, or judicial activism that
never defers on the other. I prefer to take the contextual approach of
the coordinacy theory which considers the constitution's allocation of
decision-making authority, the constitution's judgments as to the
relative risks of action and inaction by each branch of government, and
the fears and aspirations embodied in the different provisions of the
constitution. The contextual approach better attends to the specific
character of particular constitutional provisions and calibrates
deference or restraint accordingly on a case to case basis. In doing so,
it allows the legislature adequate leeway to carry out their constitutional
duties while at the same time ensuring that any abuse does not
undermine important constitutional principles."66
Justice Jose C. Vitug characterizes the Supreme Court under the 1987
Constitution as "the balance wheel in State governance, function[ing] both as the
tribunal of last resort and as the Constitutional Court of the nation." 6 7  This
development marks what Samuel Issacharoff describes as a public expectation
that constitutional courts in emerging democracies "play a more direct role in
superintending the institutions of democracy, and particularly, in defining the limits
of democratic decision-making".68 Since courts assume a critical oversight role in
political processes of participation, representation, and public accountability,
Samuel Issacharoff offers four principles for courts to prevent succumbing to a
'one-size-fits-all' approach in resolving (what were previously and exclusively)
political controversies:
1) There should be actual claims of rights violations. Issacharoff cautions
against courts loosely packaging political claims solely through individual
rights entitlements or vacuous claims of individual disenfranchisement.
Courts must be vigilant in ascertaining the existence of an actual violation
before authorizing judicial intervention.
2) Where the controversy arises from the 'obligation to ensure accountability of
the process to the electorate', judicial intervention in the political exercise is
warranted. Issacharoff places a high premium on the court's role in
protecting democratic opportunities for genuine contestation (especially in
elections), to prevent manipulation of electoral processes and institutions by
self-interested incumbents and political insiders.
3) Courts may intercede as a 'backstop against institutional desuetude'.
Issacharoff holds that judicial intervention is critical especially where the
66 Id. See concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Reynato Puno.
67 Id.
68 ISsacharoff, Samuel, "Democracy and Collective Decision Making:, 6 Int'l. J. Const. L. 231,
(April 2008), at 260.
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electoral system becomes unresponsive due to a lock-up of power (as in the
case of political dynasties) or when political institutional arrangements
'calcify' because there is 'insufficient political will for change' (or perhaps, a
lack of access to political capital that would galvanize such change).
4) Judicial oversight may serve as a 'protection against opportunism',
particularly when political boundaries 'serve to isolate those who bear the
costs from any realistic ability to challenge political decision-making occurring
elsewhere'. Issacharoff envisions an increasing role for constitutional courts
in implementing international agreements, and extending protections to
intended recipients (e.g. individuals, the environment, market players etc.)
under these agreements.
The Supreme Court's expanded role under the 1987 Constitution is
consistent with the latter's universalist design. Despite the apparent 'counter-
republican' difficulty of entrusting vigilance over our political decision-making
processes and institutions to unrepresentative courts, this difficulty is as much a
function of constitutional design as the already existing gap between the
articulated 'voice' of the majority and the elected legislature. Given power
structures, interest brokering, and negotiation processes in legislatures, there can
hardly be a straight one-to-one correspondence between the 'will of the majority'
(e.g. the Filipino people) and their elected representatives (e.g. Congress). Julian
Eule shows that the counter-majoritarian objection to judicial review is less
persuasive since the 'quest for more accurate aggregation of majority will is
misguided...the gap between the will of the majority and the voice of the
legislature, it turns out, is there by constitutional design'. 6 9 Eule narrates that the
Federalist framers of the United States Constitution also anticipated that the
representation system in republican government could fail if: 1) representatives
were too 'isolated' or insulated from checks by their constituents (e.g. regular
elections prove inadequate), resulting in oppression or abuse; or 2)
representatives were too 'responsive' to popular will, resulting in majority tyranny.
Considering both these dangers, the Federalists' constitutional design purposely
installed several 'representation filters' (e.g. separation of powers and federalism)
to "check both the people's agents and the people themselves". In comprehending
expanded judicial review under the 1987 Constitution, it may thus prove useful to
examine Eule's conclusion that judicial review must be integrated in designing
these filters:
"The 'difficulty' with judicial review entails its reconciliation with the
constitutional version of democracy, not with some abstract form that
exalts unfiltered majoritarianism. It would be more accurately
conceptualized as a 'counter-representative' or 'counter-majoritarian'
difficulty. The Framers rejected simple majority rule because of their
fear of factions. In its place they installed a representative structure
69 Eule, Julian N., "Judicial Review of Direct Democracy", 99 Yale L. J. 1503 (May 1990), at
1514.
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which simultaneously enjoyed a relative detachment from and an
ultimate accountability to the populace. And to ensure that neither
detachment nor accountability got the upper hand, they separated and
divided the repositories of power. The role of the judge can only be
assessed within the confines of this framework...
...Refined, or filtered majoritarianism, captures the virtues of
popular sovereignty without being tainted by its vices. Judicial review
must be integrated into this design."70
1.3. Universalist Orientation
The 1987 Constitution epitomizes a rich universalist rights-culture in the
Philippine constitutional system, informed by its own legal history and ideological
developments, shared legal traditions from postcolonial perspectives, and by
Philippine participation in the international legal order. It is no coincidence that
Article III, or the Bill of Rights in the 1987 Constitution, is longer than its
counterparts in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. It is not, however, the sole
repository of individual rights under the constitutional system. Together with
numerous other sections of the 1987 Constitution, the formulation of Article III
reflects the universalist conceptions and predispositions of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission.
At the time of the drafting of the 1987 Constitution, the Philippines had
already been an active participant in the development of international human rights
and humanitarian law. The Philippines was one of the original forty-eight (48)
signatories to the United Nations Declaration,71 officially joining the United Nations
as a founding member on October 24, 1945. Prior to the adoption of the 1987
Constitution,72 the Philippines had already ratified the following international
instruments: 7
70 Id. at 1532.
71 The Philippines was one of the twenty-two subsequent adherents to the January 1, 1942,
United Nations Declaration, which had twenty-six original signatories.
72 The 1987 Constitution was drafted and adopted by the 1986 Constitutional Commission on
October 15, 1986, and took effect upon ratification by the Filipino people in a plebiscite on February
2, 1987.
73 See ratification history at http://www.bayefsky.com and http://www2.ohchr.orqi (last visited 8
May 2008). Subsequent to the promulgation of the 1987 Constitution, the Philippines also ratified
the remaining two (2) major human rights treaties, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
which was ratified on August 21, 1990 and entered into force on September 20, 1990; and the
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
Their Families (CMVV) which was ratified on July 5, 1995 and entered into force on July 1, 2003.
The Philippines signed the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on September 25,
2007.
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1) International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);74
2) International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR);75
3) Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD)7 6
4) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW);77
5) Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT);7 8
6) International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid; 79
7) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide,80
7) 1949 Geneva Conventions, along with other landmark instruments on
international humanitarian law.81
74 Ratified on October 23, 1986. First Optional Protocol ratified on August 22, 1989, entered
into force on November 22, 1989. Second Optional Protocol ratified on November 20, 2007,
entered into force on February 20, 2008.
75 Ratified on June 7, 1974, entered into force January 3, 1976.
76 Ratified on September 15, 1967, entered into force January 4, 1969.
77 Ratified on August 5, 1981, entered into force September 4, 1981. Amendment on Article
20(1) accepted on November 12, 2003. Optional Protocol in relation to Articles 8, 9, 10 ratified on
November 12, 2003, entered into force on February 12, 2004.
78 Ratified on June 18, 1986, entered into force on June 26, 1987. Amendment on Articles
17(7) and 18(5) accepted on November 27, 1996.
79 Signed on May 2, 1974, and ratified on January 26, 1978.
See http://www2.ohchr.org/enqlish/bodies/ratification/7.htm (last visited 8 May 2008).
80 Signed on December 11, 1948, and ratified on July 7, 1950. See
http://www. unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b.treatyl qen. htm (last visited 8 May 2008).
81 See http://www.icrc.orq (last visited 8 May 2008).
The Philippines has already ratified the: 1) June 17, 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the
Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare; 2) July
27, 1929 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick Armies in the
Field; 3) July 27, 1929 Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; 4) December 9,
1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide; 5) November 26, 1968
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity; 6) April 10, 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction; 7) June 8,
1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II); 8) October 10, 1980
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May
Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects; 9) October 10, 1980
Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I); 10) October 10, 1980 Protocol on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II); 11) October 10,
1980 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol Ill). The
Philippines had also already signed the: 1) May 14, 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict; 2) May 14, 1954 Protocol for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict; and 3) June 8, 1977 Protocol Additional to the
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Also prior to the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the Philippines had
already acceded to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its
1967 Protocol;82 and the 1926 Slavery Convention.83 Through its membership in
the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Philippines has also expressed its
belief in the universality of human rights long before the adoption of the 1987
Constitution.84
Moreover, long before the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, Philippine
jurisprudence had also already progressively recognized the incorporation of
various international human rights and humanitarian law instruments in the
Philippine legal system. Over thirty years before the promulgation of the 1987
Constitution, the Philippine Supreme Court applied the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights as "generally accepted principles of international law [forming] part
of the law of the Nation" to rule against the indefinite detention of foreign nationals
or stateless aliens.85 In the landmark case of Kuroda v. Jalandoni,86 the Supreme
Court upheld the jurisdiction of a Military Commission (convened pursuant to the
authority of the President's powers as Commander in Chief of the armed forces) to
try the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines for
war crimes, holding that the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1).
82 The Philippines acceded to both the Refugee Convention and its Protocol on July 22, 1981.
See http://www.unhcr.orq/protect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf (last visited 20 May 2008).
83 The Philippines acceded to the Slavery Convention (but not the Protocol) on July 12, 1955.
See http://www.untreaty.un.org/english/bible/englishinternetbible/parti/chapterxviii/treaty2.asp (last
visited 28 May 2008).
84 Strict observance of the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations,
and of the right of peoples to self-determination, G.A. Res. 2160 (XXI), 1482nd plenary meeting, 30
November 1966; Respect for human rights in armed conflicts, G.A. Res. 2674 (XXV), 192 2nd
plenary meeting, 9 December 1970, G.A. Res. 2852 (XXVI), 2027th plenary meeting, 20 December
1971, G.A. Res. 3032 (XXVII), 2114th plenary meeting, 18 December 1972; Basic principles for the
protection of civilian populations in armed conflicts, G.A. Res. 2675 (XXV), 1922nd plenary meeting,
9 December 1970; Question of the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including
policies of racial discrimination and segregation and of apartheid, in all countries, with particular
reference to colonial and other dependent countries and Territories, G.A. Res. 2714 (XXV), 1930th
plenary meeting, 15 December 1970.
85 Boris Mejoff v. The Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-4254, September 26, 1951 (en banc);
Victor Borovsky v. The Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L04352,
September 28, 1951. See Pio Duran v. Salvador Abad Santos, G.R. No. L-99, November 16, 1945
(en banc), where Justice Gregorio Perfecto stated a strong dissent against the Supreme Court's
refusal to grant the petition of a Filipino political prisoner praying for bail:
"The denial of the petition is violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed, not only by the
Constitution of the Philippines, but also by the Charter of the United Nations, which is now in full
force in this country."
86 Lieutenant General Shigenori Kuroda v. Major General Rafael Jalandoni, et al., G.R. No. L-
2662, March 26, 1949.
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already formed part of the law of the Philippines even before the Philippines
signed both Conventions --- thus implicitly affirming the status of the Hague and
Geneva norms as 'generally accepted principles of international law' even in the
absence of treaty ratification:
"Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no
jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the
Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the
Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only
in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulations of the
Hague and Geneva Conventions form part of and are wholly based
on the generally accepted principles of international law. In fact,
these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent
nations, the United States and Japan, who were signatories to the
two Conventions. Such rules and principles, therefore, form part of
the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the
conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to
the recognition of rules and principles of international law as
contained in treaties to which our government may have been or
shall be a signatory."
Significantly, nearly two decades since the adoption of the 1987 Constitution,
a unanimous Philippine Supreme Court stressed the obligatory effect imposed by a
postwar Supreme Court on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in
the Philippines. Relying on the incorporation of the UDHR as generally accepted
principles of international law forming part of the law of the land, the unanimous
Court in the 2007 case of Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region
v. Hon. Felixberto T Oalia Jr. affirmed the correctness of a lower court order
granting bail to a potential extraditee (departing from previous jurisprudence that
limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings): 87
"...Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which
the right to life, liberty, and all the other fundamental rights of every
person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles
contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as
customarily binding upon the members of the international
community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, this Court, in
granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution,
the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land.
In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and
87 Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Hon. Felixberto T. Olalia Jr. and
Juan Antonio Munioz, G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007 (en banc). Emphasis supplied.
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ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights
of every person to life, liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of
nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as
value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is
enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides:
'The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights.' The Philippines, therefore has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to
liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide
without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if
justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation
to make available to every person under detention such remedies
which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies
include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan
limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however,
in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and
protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a
reexamination of this Court's ruling in Purganan is in order."
The universalist orientation of the 1987 Constitution is also readily apparent
from the stated intentions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. In Brigido R.
Simon Jr. et al v. Commission on Human Rights et aL,88 the Supreme Court noted
records of the 26 August 1986 deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission to clarify the infusion of international human rights standards in the
formulation of the 1987 Constitution's Bill of Rights:
"MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and
political rights are very broad. The Article on the Bill of Rights covers
civil and political rights. Every single right of an individual involves
his civil right or his political right. So, where do we draw the line?
MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been
made clear in the language of human rights advocates, as well as in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a
number of articles on the right to life, the right against torture, the
right to fair and public hearing, and so on. These are very specific
rights that are considered enshrined in many international documents
and legal instruments as constituting civil and political rights, and
these are precisely what we want to defend here....
88Brigido R. Simon Jr. et al. v. Commission on Human Rights et al., G.R. No. 100150,
January 5, 1994 (en banc).
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MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of
human rights, I would like to state that in the past regime, every time
we invoke the violation of human rights, the Marcos regime came out
with the defense that, as a matter of fact, they had defended the
rights of people to decent living, food, decent housing and a life
consistent with human dignity.
So I think we should really limit the definition of human rights [under
the Bill of Rights] to political rights. Is that the sense of the
committee, so as not to confuse the issue?
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President....
MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The
second covenant contains all the different rights --- the rights of labor
to organize, the right to education, housing, shelter, etc.
MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of
the committee to those that the Gentleman has specified.
MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you."
Clearly, the 1986 Constitutional Commission knowingly encapsulated
universalist ideology and perspectives in redefining the topography of
constitutional rights discourse in the 1987 Constitution. Given the Philippines' own
active participation in the development of international human rights and
humanitarian law, it is equally understandable that the framers' process of defining
individual rights in our constitutional system would also be imbued with universalist
conceptions. Finally, it can be reasonably assumed that the framers of the 1987
Constitution were not unaware of the existence of postwar Philippine jurisprudence
that already incorporated key universalist human rights norms in our constitutional
system. Indeed, such postwar incorporation of universalist norms would be
reiterated by the Philippine Supreme Court in post-1987 Constitution
jurisprudence. As I will show at the Conclusion, the 1986 Constitutional
Commission had foresight to maintain --- through the Incorporation Clause under
Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution --- a key avenue towards preserving
universalism in our constitutional system. It is to the Incorporation Clause that we
owe the comprehensive protection of the Filipino individual's human rights and in
turn, the Philippine government's corresponding obligations as a rights-respecting
sovereign independent state in the international legal order.
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1.4. Universalist Philosophy
The 1987 Constitution stands as a distinct breakaway from previous eras in
Philippine constitutional history due to its proximate derivation from the direct
exercise of popular sovereignty in the 1986 EDSA 'people power' revolution. The
1986 EDSA Revolution definitively represents the concept of 'direct democracy'.
The Filipino people's collective action of people power was motivated by the desire
for a complete overhaul of the public order, and ultimately authorized by the
sovereign will of the governed.8 9  After Ferdinand Marcos fled the country,
Corazon Aquino was proclaimed and sworn in as President of a revolutionary
government that defied Marcos' 1973 Constitution, under powers taken and
exercised 'in the name of the Filipino people'. 90 It is for this reason that Chief
Justice Reynato Puno characterizes popular sovereignty as the 'primary postulate
of the 1987 Constitution', which is decidedly 'more people-oriented' than previous
Philippine Constitutions.91
The 1986 Constitutional Commission has characterized the 1987
Constitution as "pro-life, pro-people, pro-poor, pro-Filipino, and anti-dictatorship".92
Associate Dean Myrna Feliciano explains:
"...It is pro-life because it bans nuclear weapons, protects the
unborn from the moment of conception, abolishes the death penalty
except in extreme cases when Congress may reimpose it, and
protects the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It is
considered pro-people because it includes policies to promote
people's welfare i.e. a just and humane social order, adequate social
services, the right to protection of health and to a balanced and
healthful ecology and priority to education; allows greater
participation by the people in government through a free and open
party system, sectoral representatives, people's organizations, and
the institution of the processes of initiative and referendum in law-
89 See Ackerman, Peter, and Jack DuVall, "The Right to Rise Up: People Power and the
Virtues of Civic Disruption", 30-SUM Fletcher F. World Aff. 33 (Summer 2006).
90 Noted law professor and Philippine legal historian Dante Gatmaytan states, however, that
the exercise of people power should be dissociated from the concept of democratic revolution
because 'Filipinos never attempted a fundamental change in political organization or government.
[The 1986 EDSA Revolution] was directed against Marcos alone.' Instead, he offers a view of
people power as 'an expression of outrage against a particular official, triggered by government
action', or that 'it is a withdrawal of allegiance from the official in favor of another'. See Gatmaytan,
Dante B., "It's All The Rage: Popular Uprisings and Philippine Democracy". 15 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y.
J. 1, (February 2006).
91 A description also concurred in by former Philippine Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario
Davide Jr. See Juan G. Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections et al., G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755,
June 28, 1996 (en banc), see (separate concurring opinion, Puno, J.), (dissenting opinion, Davide,
J.)
92 1986 Philippine Constitutional Commission, PRIMER: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (1986) at 26.
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making and constitutional amendment. It is pro-poor because it
includes socio-economic policies that alleviate the plight of the
underprivileged, and promotes social justice. It is pro-Filipino
because there are provisions for control by Filipinos of the economy,
educational institutions, mass media and advertising and public
utilities; reservation to Filipinos of certain areas of investment, if in
the national interest, and in the practice of all professions; a Filipino
national language and the preservation of a Filipino national culture.
It is anti-dictatorship because it puts limitations on the powers of the
President and strengthens the powers of the Congress and the
Judiciary, thus preventing the consolidation of powers in any one
person or branch of government."93
These ethical values in the 1987 Constitution mirror the central tenets of
universalist philosophy, most especially the fundamental importance of the
preservation and enhancement of human dignity. The institutions created by the
1987 Constitution have been consciously designed towards the fullest measure of
'people empowerment' 94 as the ultimate check on governmental power. This
demonstrates the framers' confidence on Filipino individual rationality and political
maturity95 to define the space for public order, and in the process, to defend the
widest possible range of liberties in the spectrum of human dignity, as well as the
material conditions that make liberty and self-determination possible. Considering
Philippine constitutional and legal history, intellectual influences, and active
participation in the international legal order, the 1986 Constitutional
Commissioners likewise assured the universalist substantive content of Filipino
conceptions of liberties and human dignity values in the terminology and
jurisprudential practice of constitutional rights discourse.
As I have endeavored to show in Part I of this Article in Volume 10 of the
Historia Constitucional, universalism is the underlying philosophy and telos behind
the institutional design and rights formulation in the 1987 Constitution because of
the unique convergence of Filipino postcolonial and postmodern legal history and
intellectual traditions. Unlike other Asian societies, our conceptions of rights are
informed more by individualist, rather than communal (e.g. Confucian) orientations.
Philippine practice in the international legal order since our original membership in
the United Nations has also revolved around a universalist conception of rights
and fundamental human dignity values. Our vision of public order, while 'pro-
Filipino' in some essential respects, is not in any way overly emphatic of an
isolationist state sovereignty. Thus, Philippine constitutional discourse under the
93 Id., pp. 189-1 90.
94 See Miriam Defensor Santiago et al. v. Commission on Elections et al., G.R. No. 127325,
March 19, 1997 (en banc), see (separate concurring and dissenting opinion, Puno, J).
95 See comments of 1986 Constitutional Commissioner Bishop Teodoro Bacani in Victorino
Dennis M. Socrates v. Commission on Elections et al., G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683, & 155083-84,
November 12, 2002, (concurring opinion, Puno, J.)
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1987 Constitution celebrates the centrality of the Filipino individual under an
assumed equality and mutual interdependence, and consequently builds public
order that both restrains and conditions the legitimate exercise of governmental
power under shared values and conceptions of freedom, justice, and the good with
the international legal order.
To complete the picture of universalism as 'constitutionalized' in the 1987
Constitution, I will focus on the modes of entry of universalist norms outside of
express textualization in constitutional language. As I show in the remaining half
of this Part II, the 1987 Constitution progressively adopts a pacifist internationalist
policy on the use of force and prohibition of nuclear weapons, and anticipated the
possible entry of universalist international legal norms under the Incorporation
Clause.
II. MODES OF ENTRY FOR UNIVERSALISM: PACIFIST
INTERNATIONALISM AND THE INCORPORATION CLAUSE
The previous half of this Part II has dealt, to some degree, with the extensive
textualization of universalist norms in the 1987 Constitution. Textualization (or
direct constitutional or legislative enactment), however, is but one of the modes of
entry for universalist legal norms in the domestic legal system. Treaty-making is
another such mode. The conceptual problems in the controversial jurisprudential
interpretations of the Philippine Executive's treaty-making powers, however, could
very well be the subject of an entire field of research, as seen from the ongoing
work of most authoritative Philippine Constitutional scholars.96
I am more concerned with a less explored mode of entry for universalist
norms, encapsulated in Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution:
"Sec. 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
96 See among others Magallona, Prof. Merlin M., "Reflections on Philippine Foreign Policy",
University of the Philippines Forum, at http://www.up.edu.phlupforum.php?issue=17&i=128 (last
visited 28 May 2008); Pangalangan, Dr. Raul C., "A Democracy of Kept Secrets", Philippine Daily
Inquirer, 28 March 2008; Roque, H. Harry, L., Memorandum submitted to the Supreme Court in
Plaridel M. Abaya, et al. v. Hon. Secretary Hermogenes E. Ebdane Jr., in his capacity as Secretary
of the Department of Public Works and Highways, et al., G.R. No. 167919, February 14, 2007;
University of the Philippines Law Center Legal, Economic and Technical Opinion on the: (1)
Contract Between the North Luzon Railways Corporation and China National Machinery and
Equipment Corporation; and (2) Buyer Credit Loan Agreement No. BLA 04055 Dated 26 February
2004 Between the Export-Import Bank of China and the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines; Petition, Jovito R. Salonga, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., in BAYAN et al. v.
Ronaldo Zamora et al., G.R. Nos. 138570, 138572, 138587, 138680, & 138698, October 10, 2000,
(en banc); JOAQUIN BERNAS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(2003 ed.); See Asian Yearbook of International Law, Volume 4, (1994), at pp. 279-280.
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policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity
with all nations."9 7
The above provision contains two universalist mechanisms: 1) a pacificist
internationalist policy on the use of force vis-a-vis a policy of comity and
cooperation; and 2) the incorporation of 'generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land'. Both of these mechanisms are
clearly undergirded by a universalist intent, but to date remain undertheorized and
underutilized in Philippine legal practice. The stream of Philippine jurisprudence
since the adoption of the 1987 Constitution exhibits some inconsistency in the
application of these universalist mechanisms. As will be subsequently shown, the
framers' conceptions of Philippine foreign policy and the Incorporation Clause were
likewise informed and shaped by universalist understandings; derived conceptions
from other constitutional orders from which the Philippines formulated the norm in
previous constitutional eras; and Philippine practices in the international legal
order.
2.1. Pacifist International Policy on the Use of Force vis-&-vis Policy of
Comity and Cooperation
The 1986 Constitutional Commission declared the function of the Declaration
of Principles and State Policies (Article II) of the 1987 Constitution as the
"statement of the basic ideological principles that underlie the Constitution. As
such, the provisions shed light on the meaning of the other provisions of the
Constitution and they are a guide for all departments of the government in the
implementation of the Constitution." 98 While generally ruling that provisions of the
Constitution are "considered self-executing, and do not require future legislation for
their enforcement", the Philippine Supreme Court has categorically declared
various sections of Article II of the 1987 Constitution as non-self executing. 99 The
97 CONST., art. II, sec. 2. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
98 Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Tingson, Vice-Chairman of Committee on Preamble,
National Territory and Declaration of Principles, Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission No.
81, September 12, 1986 (Consideration of Proposed Resolution No. 537, Article on Declaration of
Principles). See
99 See Tondo Medical Center Employees Association et al. v. The Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
167324, July 17, 2007, (en banc):
"In Tanada v. Angara, the Court specifically set apart the sections found under Article II of the
1987 Constitution as non self-executing and ruled that such broad principles need legislative
enactments before they can be implemented:
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a 'declaration of principles and state
policies'... .These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready
for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or guides in the
exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.
In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, this Court declared that Sections
11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court
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Court, however, has applied Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution in recent
cases without requiring prior legislative enactment.100
As seen from the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the
Philippine constitutional polic renouncing war is a restatement of similar principles
in the 1935 Constitution, and a verbatim reproduction from the 1973
Constitution.102 The reiteration of the policy against renunciation of war in the
1987 Constitution is described as a "confirmation of our adherence to international
harmony and order". The pacifist internationalist policy is further supplemented by
new provisions on neutrality and freedom from nuclear weapons: 103
"Sec. 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In
its relations with other states the paramount consideration shall be
national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right
of self-determination.
Sec.8. The Philippines, consistent with national interest, adopts
and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory."
Pursuant to the above constitutional policy, the 1987 Constitution also
prohibits foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines "except under
referred to Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution as moral
incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights. These provisions, which merely lay
down a general principle, are distinguished from other constitutional provisions as non self-
executing and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts; they do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights."
100 See Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Hon. Felixberto T. Olalia Jr.
et al., G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007 (en banc); Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of
the Philippines v. Health Secretary Francisco T. Duque III et al., G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007
(en banc); Priscilla C. Mijares et al. v. Hon. Santiago Javier Ranada et al., G.R. No. 139325, April
12, 2005; Arthur D. Lim et al. v. Honorable Executive Secretary et al., G.R. No. 151445, April 11,
2002 (en banc); Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Ralph C. Lantion et al., G.R. No. 139465, January 18,
2000 (en banc); BAYAN et al. v. Ronaldo Zamora et al., id at note 320; Republic of Indonesia et al.
v. James Vinzon, G.R. No. 154705, June 26, 2003 (en banc); Government of the United States of
America v. Guillermo G. Purganan et al., G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002 (en banc); M.H.
Wylie et al. v. Aurora 1. Rarang et al., G.R. No. 74135, May 28, 1992;United States of America et al.
v. Hon. Eliodoro B. Guinto, et al., G.R. Nos. 76607, 79470, 80018, 80258, February 26, 1990 (en
banc); United States of America et al. v. Hon. Luis R. Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 79253, March 1, 1993
(en banc); Loida Q. Shauf et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals et al., G.R. No. 90314, November 27,
1990.
101 1935 CONST., art. II, sec. 3: "The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national
policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as a part of the law of the
Nation."
102 1973 CONST., art. II, sec. 3: "The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national
policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land,
and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all
nations."
103 Id.
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a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held
for the purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State".104 The
Constitutional Commissioners included this prohibition out of consideration for
"national survival, the security and safety of our people, national sovereignty, and
the unique Filipino contribution to world peace and disarmament in this part of the
world".1u5 The Philippine Supreme Court, however, has not interpreted the
prohibition to include "temporarily visiting United States military and civilian
personnel" under the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Philippines
and the United States of America. 106
The constitutional policy on the renunciation of war, dating back to the 1935
Constitution, was inspired by the 1929 Kellogg-Briand Pact. The 1934
Constitutional Convention approved the renunciation policy in reference to
aggressive war, and "never to war in self-defense".107 On the other hand, the 1986
Constitutional Commission included a constitutional policy declaring the
Philippines a nuclear weapons-free zone in consideration of the "common heritare
of mankind" and growing international practice against nuclear non-proliferation.
The intention was not only to restrain Philippine foreign policy towards the
neutrality of a negative peace, but more to encourage Philippine foreign policy to
abide by (apparently Kantian) internationalist principles. Constitutional
Commissioner Felicitas Aquino discussed this pacifist internationalist policy at
length in the context of the postwar transformation of obligations in the
international legal order:
"How can neutrality be defined in the context of positive
peace as put forward in the UN Charter?
Positive peace must be distinguished from negative peace,
the latter meaning the absence of war, but a genuine peace must be
positive. To say that peace is the absence of war is to say that there
is no peace. Positive peace means to eradicate the causes of war by
creating the economic, cultural, social and political conditions that
would eliminate tension and the objective causes of wars or
conflicts...
104 CONST., art. xviii, sec. 25.
105 Id. see sponsorship speech of Commissioner Edmundo G. Garcia.
106 Id.; see Arthur D. Lim et al. v. Hon. Executive Secretary et al., G.R. No. 151445, April 11,
2002 (en banc).
107 Id. at pp. 142-144.
108 Id., see sponsorship speech of Commissioner (presently Supreme Court Associate Justice)
Adolfo S. Azcuna.
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Neutrality, therefore, in emancipating these countries from the
military blocs restores their sovereign rights, which eventually would
lead to the following conclusions:
1. Neutrality is a form of peaceful coexistence in the present
times when the forces of peace are gaining on the forces
making war and, when it is possible and indeed historically
necessary, for countries of different political systems to live
in peace and cooperate with each other.
2. This new type of neutrality is, therefore, inseparable from
peace and is a peace neutrality which contributes to world
peace. This peace neutrality excludes participation in
military blocs or military alliances, rejects all foreign military
bases and opposes the stockpiling of nuclear weapons in
the territory of the country concerned, the nuclearization of
its army and the flight of aeroplanes armed with nuclear
weapons.
3. In a period when countries adopting a policy of peace have
made headway, neutrality may well take on new forms,
including the conclusion of nonaggression pacts.
4. Particularly in the case of African and Asian countries who
have gained their independence at the cost of immense
sacrifice and suffering in a fierce struggle against
colonialism, neutrality is an essential guarantee of their
independence.
Contrary to the opinion in the years from 1940 to 1945, we
have witnessed a revival of neutrality in recent years which has not
coincided with an increase in international tension and is not due to
any weakening in the organization of the society of nations. This
revival is based on a new definition of neutrality, which in essence is
nonbelligerence and which finds itself in harmony with the UN
Charter, if their twin characteristics of flexibility and precision are to
be taken into consideration.
In Southeast Asia, the adoption of a pacifist and neutralist
foreign policy is inexorable. The recently concluded ASEAN
conference held in Manila in June this year has made it clear that the
basic security orientation of ASEAN and its individual members is one
of neutrality and nonalignment with the superpowers....
The great transformations now taking place in the structure of the
international community in this period of peaceful coexistence open
new vistas for the peoples of the world, especially for those who are
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still one way or the other subject to the exploitation of foreign
monopolies.
A policy based on the balance of power is an obstacle to a world
system of peace and international security. All this indicates the size
and extent facing the international community at the decisive period
of its history. We can thus realize the importance of the part to be
played by the Asian nations in particular, in the sense that they must
unite their efforts for the maintenance of peace by adopting an
independent foreign policy, free from subjection to any given sphere
of interest Neutrality is closely linked to national sovereignty and
independence and inconsistent with adherence to or membership in
any military pact.
Neutrality, therefore, is a concrete product, not an abstract
hypothesis of the community of nations. Leaving room as it does for
the play of different ideological attitudes and various nonmilitary
measures, neutrality can no longer be considered an expression of
national egoism or indifference to a just cause.
On the contrary, neutrality is a position that seems to be entirely
justified insofar as it represents the particular historical and
geographical circumstances of the region. It presents a compromise
between the ideals of a fully integrated organization and the political
contingencies of today. In this sense, neutrality serves the cause of
peace. It is, in fact, a force of peace." 109
Without denominating any specific ideological-philosophical school of
thought, the framers of the 1986 Constitutional Commission had apparently
contemplated and embraced core tenets of Immanuel Kant's Definitive Articles for
Perpetual Peace.110  First, the Constitutional framers expressly provided for
Philippine republicanism as the essence of its nature as a democratic state, based
on (the palpably Kantian First Definitive Article, 'the civil constitution of every state
shall be republican) recognition that lasting domestic and international peace
could only be realized if liberal political-ideological structures and constitutional-
legal institutions were in place."' Second, the 1986 Constitutional Commission's
109 Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission No. 83, September 15, 1986 (Consideration
of Proposed Resolution No. 537, Article on the Declaration of Principles), see sponsorship speech
of Commissioner Corazon Aquino; see discussions and further clarifications on neutrality and
pursuit of an independent foreign policy in Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission No. 84,
September 16, 1986, (Consideration of Proposed Resolution No. 537, Article on the Declaration of
Principles, Continuation, Period of Sponsorship and Debate).
110 IMMANUEL KANT, KANT'S PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL PROPOSAL,
(1927 ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London).
SId., September 16, 1986, clarifications between (sponsor) Constitutional Commissioner
Jose N. Nolledo and (interpellant) Constitutional Commissioner Jaime S.L. Tadeo; Record of the
1986 Constitutional Commission No. 85, September 17, 1986 (Consideration of Proposed
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pacifist internationalist vision of neutrality based on an independent foreign policy
among fellow liberal nation-states in the world order exemplifies Kant's Second
Definitive Article ('liberal republics will progressively establish peace among
themselves by means of the pacific federation or union in the foedus pacficium).12
Finally, the 1987 Constitution's entirely new provision expressing the Philippine
state's espousal and acceptance of cosmopolitan values based on dignity and
human rights113 bears strains of the universalist understanding of Kant's
'cosmopolitan right' in his Third Definitive Article ('the establishment of a
cosmopolitan law to operate in conjunction with the pacific union', where such
cosmopolitan law would be 'limited to conditions of universal hospitality). 114
The acceptance of a seemingly Kantian vision is not altogether unexpected.
At the time of the drafting of the 1987 Constitution, Kantian thought was already
greatly determinative of international legal developments facilitated under the
United Nations system. Moreover, the concepts of republicanism, liberal values,
and political cosmopolitanism had already gained considerable currency at the
time of the Philippines' ongoing active participation in the international legal
order. 115
Resolution No. 357, Article on Declaration of Principles, Continuation, Period of Sponsorship and
Debate, Second Reading), clarifications between Constitutional Commissioners Bernardo M.
Villegas, Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, Edmundo G. Garcia, Florangel Rosario Braid.
112 Id., September 16, 1986, clarifications between (sponsor) Constitutional Commissioner
Felicitas S. Aquino and (interpellants) Constitutional Commissioners Ma. Teresa F. Nieva, Yusuf R.
Abubakar, Edmundo G. Garcia, Teodulo C. Natividad, Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, Rene V.
Sarmiento, Hilario G. Davide Jr.; Id. at note 335, clarification by Constitutional Commissioner Adolfo
S. Azcuna on the renunciation of war:
"MR. AZCUNA. We can defend ourselves. We renounce war only when it is an aggressive
war.
MR. GASCON. As an aggressive policy of the State.
MR. AZCUNA. This is taken from the Pact of Paris of 1926, otherwise known as the Kellogg-
Briand Pact, which was incorporated in our Constitution in 1935. It is the renunciation of war as
an instrument of national policy. This was also elevated to the UN Charter --- renouncing the use
of threat or force in international relations. And this has ripened into what is known as a
peremptory norm in international law --- a jus cogens that is an imperative norm which not even a
binding treaty can provide against; a treaty that violates a fundamental norm in international law
would be void. So, we cannot even have a treaty allowing aggression. That would be a void
treaty. So, this is very fundamental why we put it here."
113 CONST., art. II, sec. 11: "The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights."
114 See Proposed Resolution No. 186 of Constitutional Commissioner Jose N. Nolledo
("Resolution to Include in the Declaration of Principles a Provision that the State Recognizes the
Dignity of the Human Personality and Guarantees Full Respect for Human Rights"), which was
largely accepted without debate in the final version of Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution.
115 Id; See Buergenthal, Thomas, "Codification and Implementation of International Human
Rights", pp. 15-21, in HUMAN DIGNITY: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
(1979 ed., Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies).
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2.2. The Incorporation Clause and Jurisprudential Reference to Foreign
Sources
The Incorporation Clause, (or the adoption of 'generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the land' under Article II, Section II of the 1987
Constitution) first surfaced in Philippine constitutional history in Article II, Section 3
of the 1935 Constitution ('The Philippines...adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the Nation').1 16  1934
Constitutional Convention Delegate Jose M. Aruego reports on the Convention's
inspirations and intentions in adopting this clause:
"The second part of this declaration of principle --- the adoption of
the generally accepted principles of international law as a part of the
law of the Nation --- was borrowed from section 4 of the German
Constitution and section 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Spain.
The intention of the framers of the Constitution was to incorporate
expressly into the system of municipal law the principles of international
law, the observance of which would be necessary to the preservation of
the family of nations which the Philippines was expected to join at the
expiration of the Commonwealth period in the Tydings-McDuffie law.
This provision is a formal declaration of what is considered to be
the primordial duty of every member of the family of nations, namely, to
adjust its system of municipal law so as to enforce at least within its
jurisdiction the generally accepted principles of international law." 1 17
The trend of Philippine constitutional jurisprudence from 1935 to 2007 largely
shows that the Philippine Supreme Court almost always refers to this operative
phrase in Article II, Section II of the 1987 Constitution (and its antecedent or
counterpart provisions in the 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitution) in two
senses. In the first sense, the Court uses this clause directly, as when it declares
and applies the existence of an international legal norm in the Philippine legal
system through mechanisms of "incorporation" or "transformation" (e.g. through
domestic legislative enactment). In the second sense, the Court uses this clause
indirectly or obliquely, to justify its comparative reference to foreign sources as an
aid to constitutional interpretation. Both senses to Article II, Section II of the 1987
Constitution inevitably entail acts of judicial recognition. This in itself necessitates
some detailed inquiry into the Court's methodology, most especially when the entry
of universalist norms are implicated in the process.
116 Art. II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution is a verbatim reproduction of Art. II, Sec. 3 of the
1973 Constitution: "The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations."
117 Id. at Volume 1, pp. 144-145. Emphasis supplied.
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A historical-contextual analysis of Philippine jurisprudential treatment of
Article II, Section II of the 1987 Constitution (and its similar antecedent provisions
in the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, respectively), taken alongside
some 'originalist' clarifications (particularly on the provenance of this norm from the
German Constitution and the Spanish Constitution) does yield a certain set of
possible 'governing dynamics' that could be of some assistance for judges
burdened with the task of discovering 'generally accepted principles of
international law' that form 'part of the law of the land'. Whether in the direct or
indirect senses of its usage, I submit that our application of Article II, Section II of
the 1987 Constitution can be guided by its nature as a critical avenue for the entry
and permeation of universalism in our legal system and constitutional discourse.
There is greater internal consistency to the judicial process of value-definition
when the Court applies or invokes Article II, Section II of the 1987 Constitution,
precisely because of the postcolonial and postmodern legal history, universalist
ideological motivations, and accompanying Philippine practice in the international
legal order --- all of which jointly infused the framers' ascribed meanings. Since
our human dignity value conceptions in the 1987 Constitution were either
coincidental with, or largely drawn from, universalist conceptions in the
international legal order, there is actually a much narrower gap between 'originalist'
and 'evolutionary' readings to the 1987 Constitution (especially in relation to
universalist legal norms) than expected.
And yet, there is still some reluctance to use the Incorporation Clause to
recognize the existence of international legal norms in the Philippine legal system,
largely borne out of difficulty in ascertaining the presence of the norm outside of
legislative enactment. This difficulty was recently illustrated in the debate over the
doctrine of command responsibility, when the Philippine Supreme Court
designated specialized tribunals in 2007 to try cases of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances. The doctrine became the subject of considerable
debate, since there is, to date, no statute providing for criminal penalties for
command responsibility.' 18  The Supreme Court, under a prewar (1935)
Constitutional regime, however, had previously affirmed in two landmark cases
that the 1907 Hague Re ulations and the 1949 Geneva Conventions formed 'part
of the law of the land'.l19 A landmark United States Supreme Court case, In re
Yamashita (the original antecedents of which began in the Philippines with the
prosecution of General Tomoyuki Yamashita for war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed against Filipinos during Japanese occupation in the Second
World War), reiterated the doctrine of command responsibility. On the basis of the
incorporation of the doctrine of command responsibility in the Philippine legal
18See Lopez, Allison, "Judge cites commanders criminally liable for slays", Philippine Daily
Inquirer, June 27, 2007,
at http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakinqinews/nation/view article. php?article id=7341 9 (last
visited 28 May 2008).
119 Shigenori Kuroda v. Major General Rafael Jalandoni et al., G.R. No. L-2662, March 26,
1949 (en banc); Yamashita v. Styer, .R. No. L-129, December 19, 1945 (en banc).
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system, trial court judges have been urged to take cognizance of cases filed
against high-ranking military officers believed to have either directly perpetrated, or
omitted to investigate, prosecute, or punish extrajudicial killings and/or enforced
disappearances committed by subordinates.120
When the Incorporation Clause was first textualized in the 1935 Constitution,
then Philippine Supreme Court Associate Justice Gregorio Perfecto was vocal (at
times, to the point of being outright vitriolic) in expressing his concerns about the
entry of international legal norms in the Philippine legal system. His dissatisfaction
with the use of the Incorporation Clause is best captured in his dissenting opinion
in the 1947 case f Tubb et aL v. Griess.12 1 In this case, ten out of the eleven
members of the Court voted to deny a habeas corpus petition filed by two citizens
of the United States who had been detained by the United States Army under
charges of misappropriation of United States government property destined for
military use. Among various claims, the petitioners asserted that their detention
was an unlawful infringement of Philippine courts' exclusive jurisdiction.
The Court majority affirmed the US Army's jurisdiction to detain the
petitioners. The majority decision, penned by then Philippine Supreme Court Chief
Justice Manuel Moran, anchored the petition's denial on a principle of international
law that "a foreign army allowed to march through a friendly country or to be
stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from civil
and criminal jurisdiction of the place". Accordingly, the "grant of free passage
implies waiver of all jurisdiction over the troops during their passage." The primary
sources relied upon by the Court as evidence of the international legal principle
were a United States Supreme Court decision, The Schooner Exchange v.
McFadden (7 Cranch 116), and commentaries from international law publicists
such as Wheaton, Hall, Lawrence, Oppenheim, Westlake, Hyde, McNair,
Lauterpacht, and Vattel.
The lone dissenter, Justice Perfecto, then wrote a caustic opinion1 22 on what
he deemed, at the very least, an ill-advised reliance on international law by the
Court:
"Since international law has been indiscriminately and
confusingly misapplied in support of the glaringly erroneous majority
120 See MELO COMMISSION REPORT, 22 January 2007; Desierto, Diane A., "The Contours
of Command Responsibility: Philippine Incorporation and Customary Evolution", 2 APYIHL (2006),
Asia-Pacific Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Vol. No. 2:2006-2007.
121 George L. Tubb et al. v. Thomas E. Griess, G.R. No. L-1 325, April 7, 1947 (en banc).
122 JUStice Perfecto penned two other dissenting opinions castigating the Court's use and
application of international law espousing similar doubt over the structural integrity and
constitutional meaning of the Incorporation Clause. Godofredo Dizon v. The Commanding General
of the Philippine Ryukus Command, United States Army, G.R. No. L-2110, July 22, 1948
(dissenting opinion, Perfecto, J.); Co Chain v. Eusebio Valdez et al., G.R. No. L-5, September 17,
1945 (en banc), see (dissenting opinion, Perfecto, J.)
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opinion in Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, many have
been misled into imitating the example to the extent of creating a
portentous judicial vogue. The fashion is morbidly contagious. It
seems that one is liable to lose his self-respect if he cannot invoke
international law once in a while, although to do it he has to hurriedly
scratch the surface of the science and often misread his authors, an
unavoidable risk in litigations where there is no legal issue between
nations...
Misunderstood, misinterpreted, misapplied, international law has
become a sort of juridical panacea, a universal thesaurus, always at
hand for any solution that can be desired in any ticklish litigation. It is
even recognized as endowed with aseity.
The root of this awry judicial attitude lies in a glaring
misunderstanding and misconception of section 3, Article VIII of the
Constitution which says: "The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the Nation."
There is the mistaken idea that international law had become
part of the Constitution and even superior to the primary principles
and fundamental guarantees expressly enunciated therein. To
correct such a mistake, it is necessary to remember the following
basic ideas:
1. That the declaration that the Philippines 'adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
Nation' is an enunciation of a general national policy but never
intended to lay down specific principles, provisions, or rules superior
or even equal to the specific mandates and guarantees in the
fundamental law.
2. That 'the generally accepted principles of international law'
made part of our statute books are not placed in a higher legal
hierarchy than any other that Congress may enact.
3. That said 'generally accepted principles of international law'
are not fixed and unchangeable but, on the contrary, may undergo
development and amplification, amendment, and repeal, that is, the
same biological rules that govern all laws, including the fundamental
one.
4. That the general statement made by the Constitution implies
that the principles of international law which should be considered as
part of the law of the land are subject to determination by the
agencies of government including courts of justice, and once
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determined they may be amended, enlarged, or repealed, exactly as
any act of Congress.
5. That those principles are to be gathered from many sources -
-- treaties and conventions, court decisions, laws enacted by
legislatures, treatises, magazine articles, historical facts and others --
- and the majority of them must be sifted from conflicting opinions
coming from said sources.
6. That the provisions of the Constitution should always be held
supreme and must always prevail over any contrary law without
exempting principles of international law, no matter how generally or
universally they may be respected."1 2 3
The above theory from Justice Perfecto, himself a former member of the
1934 Constitutional Convention that drafted the 1934 Constitution, did not
reference or cite any portion of the Constitutional Convention records in support of
the meaning ascribed to the Incorporation Clause. Neither did Justice Perfecto
cite any authority to support his reading of the Incorporation Clause.
This does not mean, however, that Justice Perfecto eschewed international
law altogether as a source of normativity in the Philippine legal system. In his
same dissenting opinion in Tubb, Justice Perfecto himself affirmed the primacy of
international law from the perspective of Philippine obligations under the Charter of
the United Nations:
"Proneness to read in the writings of authorities of international
law or even in judicial decisions any ruling, principle, or doctrine that
may justify the trampling down of the fundamental human rights
invoked by petitioners, rights which are specifically guaranteed in our
Constitution and in the constitutions of all democracies and
enlightened countries, must have been corrected once and for all
since June 25, 1945, when the Charter of the United Nations was
adopted in San Francisco.
Since then, the principles of international law which may happen
to be incompatible or deviating from the principles and ideals
enunciated in the Charter must be considered obsolete...
Anybody will notice that 'fundamental human rights' and 'dignity
and worth of the human person' form part of the supreme concern of
the United Nations. Neither the Philippines nor the United States of
America can honorably ignore the solemn commitments entered into
by them as members of the United Nations. All the agencies of their
123 Id., see dissenting opinion, Perfecto, J.
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respective governments, including tribunals and armies, are duty
bound to respect, obey and make effective those commitments. The
preamble of the Charter specifically provides that 'armed forces shall
not be used, save in common interest', the latter comprehending the
basic purposes of the organization of the United Nations, such as
'promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion."
I refer to the above controversy among members of the Supreme Court
under the prewar Constitution (1935) in Tubb to illustrate the extent of confusion
over the use of the Incorporation Clause in both direct (application of an
international legal norm, e.g. the waiver of jurisdiction over foreign troops granted
free passage) and indirect (judicial reference to foreign sources, e.g. foreign court
decisions and writings of international law publicists vis-a-vis UN Charter
obligations) senses, dating all the way back to the initial textualization of the
Incorporation Clause.
In order to clarify the Incorporation Clause as intended by the framers since
the 1935 Constitution (when the Clause was initially textualized) to the present
(universalist) 1987 Constitution, it is important to look to the origins of the Clause
and relate them to the 1986 Constitutional Commission's universalist aspirations.
To reiterate, the initial phraseology of the Incorporation Clause in the 1935
Constitution was drawn from section 4 of the German Constitution and section 7 of
the Spanish Constitution. The framers intended the Incorporation Clause to
ensure that the Philippine legal system would "enforce within its jurisdiction the
generally accepted principles of international law".1 24
Section 4 of the German (Weimar) Constitution stated that "[t]he universally
recognized rules of international law are valid as being constituent parts of the
German Federal law."12 5 'Generally recognized rules' under this constitutional
provision have been interpreted to refer to international law rules that "had been
recognized by Germany".126 As intended under the provision, these 'generally
recognized rules' do not require any legislative enactment before they were given
effect. 12 7 In various cases decided under the German (Weimar) Constitution,
Section 4 has been invoked to make international law an independent source of
124 Id.
125 L. ERADES, INTERACTIONS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LAW: A
COMPARATIVE CASE LAW STUDY, (1993 ed., T.M.C. Asser Instituut - The Hague), at p. 585.
126 Id., at pp. 586 and 605, citing The Gold Tax Case (1921), decided by the Reichsfinanzhof.
Judge Erades states, however, that this ruling "has never been repeated".
127 Id., at pp. 586-589.
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legal obligation within the municipal sphere,128 thus prohibiting domestic
legislatures from unilaterally abrogating international conventions.129 The
comparable provisions that maintain the intent to incorporate 'generally recognized
rules of international law' without need for legislative enactment in the present
German Constitution are Articles 25 and 100 of the 8 May 1949 Basic Law of the
Federal Republic of Germany, to wit:
"Article 25. The general rules of public international law are an
integral part of federal law. They shall take precedence over the laws
and shall directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants of the
federal territory.
Article 100. (1) If a court considers unconstitutional a law the
validity of which is relevant to its decision, the proceedings shall be
stayed, and a decision shall be obtained from the Land court
competent for constitutional disputes if the matter concerns the
violation of the Constitution of a Land, or from the Federal
Constitutional Court if the matter concerns a violation of this Basic
Law. This shall also apply if the matter concerned the violation of the
Basic Law by Land law or the incompatibility of a Land law with a
federal law.
(2) If, in the course of litigation, doubt exists whether a rule of
public international law is an integral part of federal law and whether
such rule directly creates rights and duties for the individual (Article
25), the court shall obtain the decision of the Federal Constitutional
Court.
(3) If the constitutional court of a Land, in interpreting the Basic
Law, intends to deviate from a decision of the Federal Constitutional
Court or of the constitutional court of another Land, it must obtain the
decision of the Federal Constitutional Court; if, in interpreting other
federal law, it intends to deviate from the Supreme Federal Court or a
higher federal court, it must obtain the decision of the Supreme
Federal Court."130
The above Article 25 of the Basic Law does not limit the courts solely to
Germany's recognition of the general rules of public international law, as the
German Constitutional Court has affirmed the existence of such rules from the
recognition 'by the great majority of States, not necessarily including the Federal
128 Id., at p. 586, citing In Re Diplomatic Immunities (German Foreign Office) Case decided by
the Oberlandesgericht Darmstadt on 20 December 1926.
129 Id., at p. 587, citing In Re Ciarletto, decided by the Reichsgericht on 18 January 1932.
130 Id. at p. 589. Emphasis supplied.
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German Republic'. 13 1 Both Section 4 of the German (Weimar) Constitution and
Article 25 of the (present) Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany appear to
entrust the task of recognition of the generally accepted principle of international
law more to the judiciary than any other branch of government. In declaring a
norm to be a 'generally recognized rule of international law' as contemplated in
Section 4 of the German (Weimar) Constitution, German courts have referred to
various factors, such as among others, (German) state practice in relation to the
norm, relevant treaty instruments and conventions and corresponding
interpretation in international practice, and German court decisions.132
Section 7 of the Spanish (1931) Constitution, on the other hand, stated that
"the state will respect the universal rules of international law and will incorporate
them into the positive law".133 This provision has been described as one among
various constitutional provisions that express the Spanish people's "appreciation of
its international obligations and to her role in international affairs", similar in content
to Section 4 of the German (Weimar) Constitution, Article 9 of the Austrian
Constitution of 1920, and Article 4 of the Estonian Constitution of 1920. 134 Similar
to the concerns of the framers of the 1935 Philippine Constitution in drafting the
Incorporation Clause, these analogous provisions were likewise motivated by
interest in ensuring independence and 'preservation of the family of nations'
through the recognition and enforcement of international law. As in the case of
Section 4 of the German (Weimar) Constitution, the task of recognizing what has
been 'incorporated' in the Spanish municipal legal system (under Section 7 of the
1931 Spanish Constitution as a 'generally accepted rule' or 'universal rule' of
international law) belongs more to the judiciary than any other branch of
government.
Considering the foregoing history and constitutional practice from antecedent
foreign sources of the Incorporation Clause alongside the stated intent of the
framers of the 1935 Constitution (where the Incorporation Clause was first
textualized), we elicit the following key points in considering the application of the
constitutional norm in the Philippines:
131 Id., at p. 605, citing Claim Against the Empire in Iran Case, decided by the
Bundesverfassungsgericht on 30 April 1963.
132 Id., citing among others The Ice King, decided by the Reichsgericht on 10 December 1921;
In Re Afghan Minister (Consular Activities) Case, decided by the Kammergericht on 13 October
1932; Aliens (Non-Discrimination Clause) Case decided by the Reichsfinanzhof on 24 November
1931.
133 Hudson, Manley 0., "The Spanish Constitution of 1931", 26 Am. J. Int'l L.3, (July 1932), pp.
579-582. Notably, Section 10(2) of the present (1978) Spanish Constitution states that "[p]rovisions
relating to the fundamental rights and liberties recognized by the Constitution shall be construed in
conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international treaties and
agreements thereon ratified by Spain". See English translation of the full text of the Spanish
Constitution of 1978 at http://www.senado.es.constitu i/index.html (last visited 28 May 2008).
134 Id. at p. 579. See Pergler, Charles, "Constitutional Recognition of International Law", 30
Virg. L. Rev. 2, (March 1944), pp. 326-327.
482
Embedded international legal norms. There are international legal
norms that are already present in the Philippine legal system without
having been codified by Congress. The Incorporation Clause was
intended to admit the presence of international legal norms without
need of legislative enactment.
Qualified status of the 'incorporated' international legal norm. Not
all international legal norms are deemed incorporated in the
Philippine legal system. The kind of international legal norms that
would be admitted are only those that are generally accepted
principles, or such norms as are 'necessary to the preservation of the
family of nations'.
Judiciary as gatekeepers of incorporation. The judiciary is
entrusted with the primary task of recognition, or discovering what
international legal norms have already been incorporated in the
Philippine constitutional system. This does not, however, mean that
there is no role for the executive or the legislative branch in relation to
the Incorporation Clause. Executive and legislative acts should
conform with such generally accepted principles of international law,
and may be reversed, annulled, or modified by the judiciary where they
are violative of, or inconsistent with, the incorporated international legal
norm.
The foregoing observations are important in the context of the universalist-
designed 1987 Philippine Constitution, which, as previously discussed, textualizes
many universalist norms and embodies universalist aspirations. It should be
stressed that the Incorporation Clause under the 1987 Constitution emphasizes
more universalist language, when it qualifies the "adopt[ion of] generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land" with adherence to "the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations".
Considering the expanded power of judicial review under the 1987 Constitution,
the judiciary should therefore be seen as having a wider critical role as
'gatekeepers of incorporation' of generally accepted principles of international law.
CONCLUSION
The sensitive, careful, and rigorous use of international law in Philippine
judicial constitutional practice is thus a return to the ideological origins of the 1987
Constitution. A universalist reading of the 1987 Constitution, however, does not
mean that we uncritically replace colonial or dictatorship rule with a new form of
imposed rule through 'international supremacy'. The universalist design,
orientation, and philosophy of the 1987 Constitution provides for the system of
entry of international law norms as well as corresponding checking mechanisms
for qualifying such entry. As I have tried to show throughout this work, the 1986
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Constitutional Commissioners did lay down the framework for judicial recognition
of international law in the contours of the 1987 Constitution. Judicial recognition is
by no means a clerical process for automatic admission of international law norms.
Thus, not every norm in international law stands in isolation as a "universalist"
norm that could be deemed to have constitutional status in the Philippines; neither
did the framers of the postcolonial and post-dictatorship 1987 Constitution intend a
blanket or uncritical acceptance of international law. 'Universalism' is not a new
form of colonialism or dictatorship, but rather, the ideology of fundamental human
dignity values spoken in the pluralism of legal norms and sources of normativity.
Reading universalism into the 1987 Constitution does not mean that we are
purposely weakening the Philippines as a nation-state, or that we are authorizing
the rule of a mob of individualists in the Philippine democracy. Harnessing
universalism in our constitutional canon simply encourages us towards more
openness in public reasoning, by making use of hitherto-neglected discursive
paths in the continuing scrutiny of how our governmental institutions indeed
function and wield power within Philippine public order. When we can more clearly
identify and describe the actual contours of Philippine public order, we are in a far
better position to critically test the legality of an assertion of executive power in
opposition to constitutional right both from institutional and individual perspectives.
In this sense, the genuine scope of executive power could be traced from the
nature of the power as well as its interaction with individual right. We expose the
mode of rationality that informs executive policy in the extent to which it conforms
with, or deviates from, the Filipino people's fundamental human dignity values as
expressed and incorporated in the rights, strictures, and policies of the 1987
Constitution. The broad and detailed manifold of universalism in the 1987
Constitution emphasizes to us that there are, and have long been, "governing
dynamics" to the relationship between public power and private right in Philippine
democracy. With the increasing demand for synchronicity between Philippine
governmental conduct and international law in the years to come, the Aegean task
now for the Philippine judiciary is to consciously acknowledge its constitutionally-
appointed responsibilities as the 'mediator', 'filter', and 'political gatekeeper' of
international law in the Philippine constitutional system. Our courts can give full
meaning to these mediating, filtering, and gatekeeping roles when they finally
unravel the governing dynamics of freedom and constraint --- taking in the liberal,
internationalist, and universalist normative space that our constitutional framers
envisioned from the very beginning.
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